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I. INTRODUCTION 
But at present the laws of bankruptcy are considered as laws . . . 
founded on the principles of humanity as well as justice: and to that 
end they confer some privileges, not only on the creditors, but also on 
the bankrupt or debtor himself.1 
For better or for worse, we live in an age of consumer credit.  To that 
end, it is beyond contention that the use of consumer credit has become a 
part of American culture.2  Indeed, during the course of the twentieth 
century, attitudes about debt and consumption shifted from moral shame 
to resounding acceptance.3  Many believe quite firmly that the escalation 
in the utilization of consumer credit during the past four or five decades 
is the result of a loss of personal self-discipline and the rise of 
materialistic cupidity by the average consumer.4  Despite this belief, 
however, borrowing and lending by American consumers have been 
prevalent practices since the late nineteenth century.5  But it is in the past 
few decades that the average American has become indebted and over-
extended like never before.  And while it would certainly be 
disingenuous to suggest that a segment of American consumers have not 
attempted to live avariciously beyond their practical means, in today’s 
                                                     
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  The author would 
like to thank Professor Alan Chen and Professor Richard Lieb for providing comments on an earlier 
draft of this Article. 
 1. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *471. 
 2. For a historical analysis of the rise of consumer credit in the United States, see generally 
LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER 
CREDIT (1999). 
 3. Id. at 20. 
 4. Id. at 33. 
 5. Id. at 39.  According to the research of Lendol Calder, “[t]he 1890 census figure would 
apportion to each household in the United States about $880 of debt.”  Id. at 40.  This amount is 
striking, particularly because the average annual wage of non-farm workers for the year 1890 
amounted to $475.  Id. 
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economic times “[t]he significance of consumer credit is now measured 
by the fact that for [both lower and] middle-class people it has become 
virtually impossible to live the American dream without access to” 
consumer credit of all stripes.6  Consequently, the use of consumer credit 
has become a necessity of everyday life, a mechanism for a family to live 
beyond the bounds of poverty.  Simply put, for America in 2009, credit 
underscores everyday life.7  In this national economy, “most low- and 
moderate-income people borrow to live on their income.  They are not 
borrowing to keep up with the Joneses; they are borrowing to stay afloat, 
to keep up with payments for housing, food, transportation, and health 
care.”8 
Though the United States economy has been growing for the past 
several decades, the majority of individuals have little to show from such 
progress.9  Various economic indicators corroborate this assertion.  For 
instance, as of 2004, the median wage in the United States was the same 
as it was thirty years before.10  Further, the “real income of the bottom 90 
percent of American taxpayers has declined steadily: they earned 
$27,060 in real dollars in 1979, $25,646 in 2005.”11  And, “[w]hile 
median net wealth grew from $69,465 to $93,001 from 1989 to 2004, it 
was outpaced by consumer debt, which more than doubled during the 
same period, from $22,000 to $55,300.”12 
By all measures, American consumers are inundated with debt; 
today, the average person owes more money to more people than ever 
                                                     
 6. Id. at 291.  As economist Mark Zandi notes: “Outside of employment, nothing determines 
the economic well-being of most American households more than a house.  Most of us spend as 
much on our home as our incomes and wealth allow . . . .  Owning a home is a basic theme of nearly 
everyone’s American dream.”  MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 360° LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME 
MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS 47 (2009).  Significantly, 
in an average year “more than three-fourths of all home sales require a mortgage loan, and, on 
average, about three-fourths of a home’s purchase price is paid for with borrowed money.”  Id. at 63. 
 7. Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 603 (2009) (“Without a doubt, credit has become an essential part of the 
consumer economy and is relied upon by many as both a convenience and a necessity.”). 
 8. Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky, Introduction: Borrowing to Live, in BORROWING TO 
LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 1, 3 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky 
eds., 2008).  Even more broadly, one noted economist recently described “credit” as “the mother’s 
milk of a well-functioning economy.”  ZANDI, supra note 6, at 28. 
 9. See Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?  An Empirical Study of 
Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 353 (2008) (“Continuing a trend begun in the early 
1980s, the families in bankruptcy are much more deeply laden with debt.  Their net worth, which has 
always been negative, sank further, and their debt-to-income ratios rose higher.”). 
 10. BILL MCKIBBEN, DEEP ECONOMY: THE WEALTH OF COMMUNITIES AND THE DURABLE 
FUTURE 11 (2007). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Eric S. Belsky et al., Consumer and Mortgage Credit at the Crossroads, in BORROWING TO 
LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED, supra note 8, at 5. 
0.6.0_SOUSA FINAL 2/22/2010  6:37:59 PM 
2010] THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSUMER UTILITY 555 
before.13  In 2004, 76.4% of all households reported some form of 
consumer borrowing, 46.2% carried a balance on at least one credit card, 
48% reported paying a mortgage loan or line of credit, 39.5% reported 
making loan or lease payments on an automobile, 13.4% reported 
obligations on student loans, and 19.3% reported some other form of 
borrowing indebtedness.14  In fall of 2005, household debt was 113% of 
annual income on average.15  Furthermore, according to the Federal 
Reserve, Americans are now carrying approximately $899.4 billion in 
revolving credit debt;16 indeed, the average outstanding credit-card debt 
for households with a credit card was $10,679 at the end of 2008.17  
Significantly, when the current recession began in December of 2007, the 
longest lasting recession since World War II,18 aggregate household debt 
was still climbing.  No doubt, the past eighteen months of national 
financial upheaval has only amplified the economic crisis for the average 
American.  Consequently, many Americans are finding themselves in a 
“debt trap that they are having difficulty escaping.”19 
Admittedly, consumers are not entirely blameless in amassing 
unmanageable debt obligations.20  Granted, one way to prevent future 
consumer economic crises is to limit borrowing and to exercise personal 
                                                     
 13. See WILLIAM BONNER & ADDISON WIGGIN, EMPIRE OF DEBT: THE RISE OF AN EPIC 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 212 (2006); see also Lupica, supra note 7, at 557 (commenting that American 
consumers are indebted “to a degree never before seen in history”); Lawless et al., supra note 9, at 
365 (“Today’s families seeking bankruptcy relief owe more than twice as much as they did in earlier 
generations.”). 
 14. Belsky et al., supra note 12, at 5. 
 15. BONNER & WIGGIN, supra note 13, at 212. 
 16. FEDERAL RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE, CONSUMER CREDIT: AUGUST 2009, http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20091007/g19.pdf. 
 17. Ben Woolsey & Matt Schulz, Credit Card Statistics, Industry Facts, Debt Statistics, 
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-industry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-127 
6.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). 
 18. Associated Press, Consumers, Still Wary, Borrowed Less in May, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, 
at B8. 
 19. Belsky et al., supra note 12, at 6. 
 20. Particularly with the now seemingly distant housing “boom” and the subsequent subprime 
mortgage meltdown, many “[h]ome buyers saw a chance to make outsized returns on homes by 
taking on big mortgages.”  ZANDI, supra note 6, at 14.  But perhaps more profoundly, Professor Lois 
R. Lupica opines that the American consumer is not acting under “blind duress” in the incurrence of 
debt and the corollary acceptance of consumerism.  Lupica, supra note 7, at 575.  Rather, and in 
perfect compliance with the credit industry’s intentions, Professor Lupica argues that “consumers 
have voluntarily adopted and realized the illusion of a middle class identity in their willingness to 
acquire ‘stuff’ at any cost.”  Id.  As Professor Lupica further notes: “Consumers know that carrying a 
balance on a credit card makes all purchases more expensive and that using home equity funds to go 
on a Disneyland vacation can mean financing it over thirty years.  Nevertheless, the acquisition 
yields significant benefits for consumers: an identity in addition to the ‘stuff.’”  Id. at 575–76 
(footnotes omitted). 
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self-restraint.21  Although it is true that Americans have been spending 
less and saving more to cope with the current recession, incremental 
savings and a newly found aversion to borrowing will not rescue the 
average American consumer from the noted “debt trap.” 
While theories explaining the expansion of consumer credit during 
the past decade or so abound22—all of which are certainly plausible 
explanations—the consumer credit market itself is primarily responsible 
for incentivizing increased consumerism through the liberalization of 
available credit.23  That is, the high debt levels for such possessions as 
residential homes, automobiles, and household goods for both the lower 
and middle classes have been prompted, and actively promoted, by the 
                                                     
 21. This is already occurring, albeit to a limited degree.  For example, from April to May of 
2009, consumer credit fell at an annual rate of 1.5%.  Associated Press, supra note 18.  The personal 
savings rate jumped to 6.9% in May of 2009, the highest since December of 1993.  Id. 
 22. There is no dearth of commentators offering opinions as to the causes of the current 
financial crisis.  For example, economist Mark Zandi explains the home mortgage problem: 
The reality is that there is plenty of blame to go around.  A financial calamity of this 
magnitude could not have taken root without a great many hands tilling the soil and 
planting the seeds.  Among the elements that fed the crisis were a rapidly evolving 
financial system, an eroding sense of responsibility in the lending process among both 
lenders and borrowers, the explosive growth of new, emerging economies amassing cash 
for their low-cost goods, lax oversight by policymakers skeptical of market regulation, 
incorrect ratings, and of course, what economists call the ‘animal spirits’ of investors and 
entrepreneurs. 
ZANDI, supra note 6, at 2.  Eric S. Belsky, Ren S. Essene, and Nicolas P. Retsinas describe the 
causes in this manner: 
Expanded access to credit, particularly mortgage credit, is usually singled out as an 
important contributor to increasing debt-service ratios.  The relaxation of constraints on 
maximum permissible debt-to-income ratios also figures prominently.  Some argue that 
the rising cost of such items as housing and education has forced households to borrow 
more to maintain a fixed standard of living.  Others blame the profligate consumer or 
today’s consumer culture for increased consumption and debt. 
Belsky et al., supra note 12, at 6–7.  Professor Lois R. Lupica attributes current consumer over-
indebtedness to liberal credit solicitations, “confusing and exploitive lending rates and terms,” 
inadequate underwriting standards, “shifts in consumptive norms,” loss of consumer frugality, 
financial ignorance, and an “increasing tolerance toward debt.”  Lupica, supra note 7, at 560.  
Finally, William Bonner and Addison Wiggin offer this account for the rise in consumer 
indebtedness: 
As the gusts of credit, debt, borrowing, and spending blew across the nation, very few of 
the old attitudes and institutions were left standing.  Apart from Vernon Hill and a few 
others, lenders stopped worrying about the quality of their borrowers.  Savings and loan 
businesses might as well have dropped the word savings from their names.  And calling 
lenders thrifts was practically a lie; the whole industry bent to a new task—to load up 
consumers with as much debt as possible. 
BONNER & WIGGIN, supra note 13, at 242–43. 
 23. Such an indictment is certainly not new.  Indeed, more than twenty years ago, Professor 
Charles G. Hallinan recognized that “many consumer lenders are driven by competitive necessity to 
‘exploit’ their customers’ weaknesses and incapacities through the hard selling of ‘easy’ credit.”  
Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and 
an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 67–68 (1986). 
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credit industry.  As Professor Lois R. Lupica tellingly describes, 
“[c]onsumer debt provided the fuel for the explosion of the markets for 
consumer goods, services, and credit.  Debt became necessary to sustain 
the markets’ very existence, and thus widespread incentives to increase 
consumer debt levels emerged.”24 
More than a decade ago, Professor Elizabeth Warren commented on 
the need for consumers to have a respite from their mounting 
indebtedness: 
Americans need a safety valve to deal with the financial consequences 
of the misfortunes they may encounter.  They need a way to declare a 
halt to creditor collection actions when they have no reasonable 
possibility of repaying.  They need the chance to remain productive 
members of society, not driven underground or into joblessness by 
unpayable debt.25 
With the national unemployment rate reaching 9.5% as of July of 
2009,26 the highest level in more than a quarter-century,27 sustained 
levels of unemployment are very likely to afflict American life for many 
months and perhaps much longer.  This will effectively dump more 
jobless people into a weak labor market, making it harder for those 
already unemployed to find work, with the resulting consequences of 
depressed wages and reduced hours.28 
The safety valve Professor Warren alluded to, and for which many 
Americans have turned, and will turn to, is filing for bankruptcy relief.  
In the past two years, the subject of bankruptcy and the economic plight 
of the American consumer have become part of the national 
consciousness.  The topic has permeated discussions on economics, 
politics, social welfare, and business—and for good reason.  Despite the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (BAPCPA) in 2005, with one of its intended goals of reducing yearly 
bankruptcy filings, the number of individuals declaring bankruptcy has 
skyrocketed during the recession.  During the twelve-month period 
                                                     
 24. Lupica, supra note 7, at 601–02. 
 25. Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
483, 492 (1997). 
 26. Peter S. Goodman, Joblessness Hits 9.5%, Deflating Recovery Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 
2009, at A1.  The “underemployment rate,” which “captures not only the jobless but also those 
working part time because their hours have been cut or they cannot find a full-time job,” causes this 
figure to jump to 16.5%.  Id. at A3. 
 27. David Leonhardt, In Recession, a Bleaker Path for Workers to Slog, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2009, at A1. 
 28. Goodman, supra note 26, at A3. 
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ending December 31, 2008, 1,074,225 non-business bankruptcies were 
filed, and 714,389 Chapter 7 petitions and 358,947 Chapter 13 petitions 
were filed.  Further, for the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2009, 
bankruptcy filings overall rose by 33.3% from the overall filings for the 
twelve-month period ending March 31, 2008.29  According to the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the total number of 
bankruptcies filed during the first six months of 2009 increased by 36.5% 
over the same period in 2008.30 
Another avowed purpose of BAPCPA was to stop the perceived 
abuse of the bankruptcy system by high-income-consumer debtors who 
decided to shirk their financial obligations by filing for bankruptcy 
relief—primarily through Chapter 7—rather than repay creditors.  The 
arguments traditionally advanced by the credit industry in seeking 
bankruptcy law reform, namely, that systemic abuse of the consumer 
bankruptcy process was occurring, have been a mythical construction of 
self-serving propaganda.31  And despite the reality of a bleak financial 
picture for millions of Americans, BAPCPA was enacted to the delight 
of the consumer credit industry.  But, as Professor Charles Jordan Tabb 
aptly notes, one significant effect of BAPCPA “is to deny many 
consumer debtors an immediate discharge of their debts in Chapter 7 
liquidation bankruptcy, leaving only the Hobson’s choice of foregoing 
bankruptcy relief altogether or attempting to ‘repay their creditors the 
maximum that they can afford’ in a Chapter 13 repayment plan,” while at 
the same time living so close to the financial precipice that economic 
rehabilitation is virtually impossible to accomplish.32 
Tellingly, the empirical data developed by Professor Elizabeth 
Warren and others over the past decade demonstrates that the consumer 
bankruptcy system is not rife with abuse.  Rather, the consumer 
bankruptcy system33 is generally utilized by American families in grave 
                                                     
 29. Press Release, U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Continue to Rise (June 8, 2009) http://www 
.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2009/BankruptcyFilingsMar2009.cfm. 
 30. AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE ABI UPDATE: JULY 2, 2009, http://www.abiworld 
.org/e-news/07-02-09.html. 
 31. See Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow 
Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 88 (1986) (“Although 
they [(the credit industry in general)] provide no clear objective standards for finding such abuse of 
the bankruptcy process, the sparse ‘legislative history’ of the [1984] Amendments and the more 
prolific background surrounding prior drafts of the legislation are rife with the same subjective sense 
that some debtors were abusing the federal bankruptcy laws.”). 
 32. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 1–2 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 33. The phrase “consumer bankruptcy system” is used to denote individuals filing for 
bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (straight liquidation) or Chapter 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (an adjustment or a restructuring of debt for an individual with regular income). 
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financial circumstances.34  As demonstrated by the figures provided 
above, for today’s lower-income and even middle-class families, 
“[m]edian family incomes have declined, basic expenses have risen, and 
families are shouldering unprecedented debt loads.”35  Mix into this 
dynamic an unanticipated event such as a medical illness, job loss, or 
divorce, and a perfect stew for financial ruin results.  Indeed, studies 
show that the vast majority of Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings are prompted 
by such life altering events as significant medical illnesses, long-term 
interruptions in employment, death of a spouse, or personal business 
failure.36  Faced with this confluence of events, resorting to the 
bankruptcy process is almost inevitable. 
If one accepts as accurate these empirical findings regarding the 
characteristics of the mainstream debtor—for example, an individual or a 
family faced with a firestorm of financial and personal upheaval with an 
inability to overcome existing debt obligations—then there is apparently 
a vast disconnect between reality and the presumptions of Congress 
regarding the stereotypical, but largely non-existent, abusive debtor.  
Further, if the term “abuse” as seized upon by Congress in enacting the 
legislation, and by the credit industry during its lobbying efforts leading 
                                                     
 34. Warren, supra note 25, at 493.  As a recent empirical article on bankruptcy law conducted 
by a gathering of academics from different disciplines concludes, individuals and families currently 
filing for bankruptcy relief are in historically worse financial despair than in previous decades, as 
median net worth continues to plummet while total debt loads grow exponentially.  See Lawless et 
al., supra note 9, at 373 (explaining that families currently filing for bankruptcy protection “are in 
worse shape than those filing in earlier years” due to an increase in total debts and a decrease in net 
worth). 
 35. Lawless et al., supra note 9, at 349–50 (footnotes omitted). 
 36. In an empirical study conducted by Professor Warren, “more than eight out of ten families 
with children” identify just three reasons for their bankruptcy filings: “job loss, family breakup, and 
medical problems.”  See Elizabeth Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle Class Families, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 401, 411 (2004) [hereinafter Warren, The Growing Threat].  For other scholarly 
literature on the causes of consumer bankruptcy filings, see also TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE 
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 2 (2000) (noting that financial stress leading to 
bankruptcy comes from five sources, including “volatility of jobs,” “divorce and changing parenting 
patterns,” and “medical problems”); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-
INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 7–8 (explaining 
why two-income families are no longer financially prepared for unseen dangers, such as a child 
getting sick, a father losing a job, or a divorce); Lawless, et al., supra note 9, at 379 (explaining that 
one model of consumer bankruptcy argues that “[f]amilies are driven to bankruptcy when they suffer 
serious economic dislocations, such as job loss, medical problems or family breakups”); Tabb, supra 
note 32, at 14 (stating that “[s]tudies show that the vast majority of Chapter 7 bankruptcies are 
caused by medical problems, divorce, or job layoffs”); Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 
IND. L.J. 1079, 1100 (1998) [hereinafter Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis] (stating that whether 
through layoffs, medical debt, divorces, or other problems, “[e]very personal bankruptcy filing 
represents a family crisis”); Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes 
Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 145 (2003) [hereinafter Warren, Financial Collapse and 
Class Status] (explaining that job difficulties, medical debt, and divorce may “figure importantly in 
[a family’s] financial demise”). 
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to the enactment of BAPCPA, means incurring debt with a subsequent 
inability to repay and consequently choosing to file for bankruptcy relief, 
then the meaning of “abuse” would be wholly inconsistent with 
traditional bankruptcy philosophy.37  All of this leads to a single 
observation; namely, the time is perfectly ripe for Congress, the courts, 
the academic community, and other participants in the consumer 
bankruptcy system to reevaluate the policies, goals, and purposes of the 
bankruptcy laws. 
This devolves into an obvious inquiry: where should one start in the 
reexamination process?  The only reasonable place to begin is the 
consumer-bankruptcy discharge.  As will be discussed more fully below, 
in the past, bankruptcy law scholars have advanced an assortment of 
theories for explicating the consumer-bankruptcy discharge.  To be sure, 
these theories are all plausible explanations and certainly attractive, and 
the purpose of this contribution is not to dissect or critique these existing 
theories.  Nevertheless, one way in which all of the previous theories 
arguably fall short is that they prove to be too restrictive to account for, 
and rectify, all of the issues facing the individual debtor. 
Therefore, what this Article attempts to do is propose a general 
overarching philosophical theory, a “metatheory,” which is then applied 
to a particular, concrete problem.38  Accordingly, this Article advances a 
metatheory for the consumer-bankruptcy discharge predicated upon 
classical utilitarianism.  Whether one agrees with utilitarianism as an 
appropriate theory of justice and morality, it is undeniably a powerful 
concept—one that has engendered much discussion in the scholarly 
literature of the disciplines of philosophy, law, and economics.39  To be 
                                                     
 37. See Gross, supra note 31, at 150 (making a similar point but in the context of interpreting 
certain amendments to the Bankruptcy Code promulgated by Congress in 1984). 
 38. Professor Karen Gross recognized such an approach.  See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND 
FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 15 (1997). 
 39. See generally RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS (1992) 
(discussing utilitarianism in the context of normative ethics, moral rights, and public policy); D. H. 
HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM: A STUDY IN NORMATIVE ETHICS AND LEGAL 
THEORY (1967) (arguing against “certain forms of utilitarianism” because of the consequences of 
using utilitarian principles); P. J. KELLY, UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: JEREMY 
BENTHAM AND THE CIVIL LAW (1990) (discussing criticisms of Jeremy Bentham’s theory of 
distributive justice); DAVID LYONS, IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNED: A STUDY IN BENTHAM’S 
PHILOSOPHY OF UTILITY AND LAW (1973) (exploring Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism and his 
theory of law); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY (2001) (discussing the use of 
utilitarianism in economics); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (comparing classical 
utilitarian concepts of justice with “justice as fairness”); J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (presenting a system of utilitarian ethics called “act-
utilitarianism”); PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE 
(1996) (describing unusual moral judgments and stating that, at times, utilitarian philosophy might 
explain it); UTILITY AND RIGHTS (R. G. Frey ed., 1984) (exploring unconstrained utilitarianism and 
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sure, adopting a utilitarian approach reflects a particular normative 
selection among competing values and alternative possibilities.40 
Nevertheless, utilitarian positions have been adopted for many 
divergent purposes.  However, two overriding lines of thought can be 
identified.  One line of thought urges the merits of utilitarianism as a 
“general moral philosophy,” while the other adopts utilitarianism as 
proposing a principle that is especially appropriate to the decisions of 
public bodies, such as legislatures and courts, “even if [this utilization of 
the principle] does not form the ultimate basis of morality in general.”41  
This Article is concerned with the latter approach; that is, to propose an 
operative metatheory of the consumer-bankruptcy discharge—one that 
can be adopted by the bankruptcy courts in construing relevant 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or by Congress if it ever seriously 
reexamines the efficacy of and assumptions underlying BAPCPA.  
Admittedly, one limitation of this Article is its failure to develop 
solutions to all possible issues in advocating a theory of discharge based 
on utilitarianism.  That said, however, the primary goals are both narrow 
and broad at the same time; narrowly, to serve as a corrective response to 
the congressional enactment of BAPCPA and the current economic crisis 
plaguing the nation, and broadly, to advance the debate on consumer 
bankruptcy theory and policy. 
Part II of this Article discusses the parameters and scope of the 
bankruptcy discharge.  Part III addresses the efforts by the consumer-
credit industry to have the bankruptcy laws reformed.  Part IV discusses 
several features of BAPCPA that hinder a debtor’s ability to obtain a 
complete fresh start.  Part V discusses the existing scholarly literature 
and theories of the consumer-bankruptcy discharge.  Part VI discusses 
classical-utilitarian philosophy and then proposes a contemporary 
“consumer utility” theory of the bankruptcy discharge that is derivative 
of those utilitarian principles.  Part VII then applies this theory of 
discharge to the consumer-bankruptcy dynamic, and offers certain 
reform proposals for Congress and the courts.  Part VIII raises and 
discusses potential objections to the consumer-utility theory advanced 
herein.  Finally, Part IX offers a brief conclusion. 
                                                                                                                       
the rights-theory); RAYMOND WACKS, UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL THEORY (2005) (discussing utilitarianism as it relates to theories of justice and theories of 
rights). 
 40. See Ronald A. Cass, Coping with Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the 
Law-and-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. REV. 73, 89–91 (1987) (recognizing this potential limitation 
in the context of parental adoptions). 
 41. N.E. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE: JUSTICE, LAW AND RIGHTS 19 
(1986). 
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II. THE NATURE, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE OF THE CONSUMER DISCHARGE 
To be sure, one of the central, if not the most significant, policies 
underlying consumer bankruptcy law is the notion of the “discharge” of 
one’s indebtedness.42  The legal effect of a bankruptcy discharge is 
relatively straightforward with respect to individual debtors.  The entry 
of a discharge “operates to release an individual debtor’s in personam 
obligation to pay prepetition indebtedness and serves as a permanent 
injunction against any act to collect a discharged debt.”43  This freedom 
from personal liability for pre-petition debt is known as the proverbial 
“fresh start.”44  In other words, the discharge of debts, particularly in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, represents a trade-off: a financially 
struggling debtor is generally relieved of his or her pre-petition 
                                                     
 42. See Nancy C. Dreher & Matthew E. Roy, Bankruptcy Fraud and Nondischargeability 
Under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 69 N.D. L. REV. 57, 57 (1993) (“The most sweeping 
remedy available to a debtor in bankruptcy is the discharge of the debtor’s personal liability to his or 
her creditors.”); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 977 
(1981) (recognizing that the notion of a discharge “dominates consumer bankruptcy law”); Richard 
E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of the 
Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 515 (1991) (“The essence of our consumer 
bankruptcy law is the discharge.” (footnote omitted)); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law 
for Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 55 (2002) (noting that the discharge and “fresh start” 
is a major breakthrough of contemporary bankruptcy law); Garrard Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: 
Prevention of Fraud, and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REV. 373, 380 (1937) (noting that the 
“privilege” of a discharge of one’s debts was “one of the greatest of liberal reforms” of bankruptcy 
law); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 
1047 (1987) (“That we should have some system of discharge in bankruptcy is a settled question.”); 
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 
(1985) (“Discharge, the doctrine that frees the debtor’s future income from the chains of previous 
debts, lies at the heart of bankruptcy policy.”); Philip Shuchman, An Attempt at a “Philosophy of 
Bankruptcy”, 21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 420–21 (1973) (“The most significant aspect of [debtors’] 
bankruptcies is the granting of the discharge, which serves as a legally effective bar to further 
collection efforts by most creditors.”); Warren, supra note 25, at 483 (noting that the bankruptcy 
discharge, and its accompanying “fresh start,” is a “star[] of consumer bankruptcy”). 
 43. George H. Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of 
Nondischargeability in Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 325; see also Johnson v. 
Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) (noting that a “bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only 
one mode of enforcing a claim—namely, an action against the debtor in personam—while leaving 
intact another—namely, an action against the debtor in rem.”); In re Hawkins, 377 B.R. 761, 766 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (“A Chapter 7 discharge, 11 U.S.C. § 727, voids all of the debtor’s personal 
liability on a debt.”). 
 44. See Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study of Consumers’ Post-Discharge Finances: 
Struggle, Stasis, or Fresh-Start?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283, 283 (2008) (“Bankruptcy’s 
central theoretical objective, from the perspective of the individual debtor, is to afford debtors the 
opportunity for a ‘fresh start.’”); see also Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 
20 WHITTIER L. REV. 141, 141 (1999) (“The fresh start principle generally takes the form of 
forgiving the debtor part or all of the debts she incurred prior to her bankruptcy filing.”); Katherine 
Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 68 
(2006) (“The principal theory of consumer bankruptcy in America is that it provides a ‘fresh start’ to 
debtors.”). 
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indebtedness by being granted a discharge, and in return, the debtor is 
required to surrender certain assets to the bankruptcy court and 
bankruptcy trustee.  Although the concept of a discharge of one’s 
indebtedness first appeared in England in 1705 in the Statute of 4 Anne,45 
the modern discharge in American bankruptcy law did not appear until 
1898. 
A codified bankruptcy law has been a part of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence for approximately half a millennium.46  The provision of a 
federal-bankruptcy-law-system is provided for in the United States 
Constitution itself.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
throughout the United States . . . .”47 
The first United States bankruptcy law was passed in 1800, but 
remained in existence for only three years.48  Under the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1800, the discharge was available only to merchants forced into 
bankruptcy involuntarily, and who ended up cooperating with creditors 
in the bankruptcy proceeding by turning over non-exempt assets.49  
Furthermore, before a discharge could be granted, the bankruptcy 
“commissioners” of the time “had to certify to the federal district judge 
that the debtor had cooperated, and two-thirds of the creditors, by 
number and by value of claims, had to consent to the discharge.”50 
Congress enacted the next federal-bankruptcy law in 1841, and it 
lasted for only two years.51  As Professor Charles Jordan Tabb describes, 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 represented a “watershed event in 
bankruptcy history” for two principal reasons.52  First, filing for 
bankruptcy could now be accomplished voluntarily by the debtor, as 
opposed to solely involuntarily by a contingency of creditors.53  Second, 
                                                     
 45. An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts, 1705, 4 Ann., c. 17, § 17 
(Eng.). 
 46. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1991). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 48. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 
248 (1803). 
 49. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions 
and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 63 (1990). 
 50. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 15 (1995). 
 51. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 
614. 
 52. Tabb, supra note 50, at 17. 
 53. Id. 
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the bankruptcy process was opened to “all persons,” and not strictly 
limited to the class of merchants or traders under prior law.54  Moreover, 
the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 aided in the availability 
of debtors actually receiving a discharge of their debts; that is, a debtor 
would receive a discharge of debt unless a majority of creditors in 
number and amount of indebtedness took affirmative action to contest 
the discharge.55 
Quite significantly, in the legislative debates preceding the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, Whig party leader Henry Clay 
made remarks reflective of a philosophy that the bankruptcy laws should 
serve a purpose greater than simply relieving the immediate debtor from 
his or her debts.  Senator Clay commented: 
The right of the State (I use the term in its broadest sense), to the use of 
the unimpaired faculties of its citizens as producers, as consumers, and 
as defenders of the commonwealth, is paramount to any rights or 
relations which can be created between citizen and citizen.  But an 
honest and unfortunate debtor, borne down by a hopeless mass of debt 
from beneath which he can never rise, is prostrated and paralyzed, and 
rendered utterly incapable of performing his duties to his family or his 
country.  To say nothing of the dictates of humanity . . . I maintain that 
the public right of the State, in all the faculties of its members, moral 
and physical, is paramount to any supposed rights which appertain to a 
private creditor.  This is the great principle which lies at the bottom of 
all bankrupt laws, and it is this which gives to the States the right to 
demand the passage, and imposes upon congress the duty of enacting a 
bankrupt system.56 
The next federal-bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, lasted 
until 1878.57  The subsequent Bankruptcy Act of 1898 represented the 
beginning of permanent federal-bankruptcy legislation.58  The view of a 
national-bankruptcy law serving as social legislation for the public good 
was carried forward to the debates leading up to the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.59  For example, in the opening debate on the 
                                                     
 54. Id. 
 55. Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 229 (1976); 
see also Tabb, supra note 50, at 17 (“Creditors could . . . block the discharge, but only through a 
written dissent filed by a majority in number and value of creditors.”). 
 56. John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 428 (2000) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 816 (1840) 
(emphasis added)). 
 57. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 
Stat. 99. 
 58. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). 
 59. For example, in 1883 the United States Supreme Court commented as follows with respect 
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bankruptcy bill, Senator Lindsay provided the following justification for 
the consumer discharge in pertinent part as follows: 
The fact is that a discharge can be justified only upon the grounds of 
sound public policy; that is, the State is more interested in having an 
honest debtor relieved from obligations he can not meet, and given an 
opportunity to better support and educate his family and accumulate 
property upon which to pay taxes, than in having him held in financial 
bondage forever by individual creditors.  The binding obligation of a 
contract ought not to be annulled except on this ground . . . .  The true 
doctrine is that no dishonest debtor should receive a discharge, no 
matter what percentage his estate pays or what number of his creditors 
have been induced to assent; but, on the other hand, every honest 
debtor should be discharged, irrespective of the money value of his 
estate or the assent of his creditors.60 
As Professor Tabb has observed, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 marked 
“the arrival of the ‘modern’ American pro-debtor discharge policy.”61  
This feat was accomplished in two specific ways.  In contrast to 
historical precedent, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 wrested control of the 
discharge from the court and at the same time eliminated the need for 
creditor consent or a minimum dividend as a prerequisite for a debtor to 
obtain a discharge.62  Aptly, and as Professor Tabb noted, “[T]he notion 
that the debtor’s entitlement to a discharge rests solely on the impact on 
                                                                                                                       
to the national bankruptcy laws: 
The constitution expressly empowers the congress of the United States to establish such 
laws.  Every member of a political community must necessarily part with some of the 
rights which, as an individual, not affected by his relation to others, he might have 
retained.  Such concessions make up the consideration he gives for the obligation of the 
body politic to protect him in life, liberty, and property.  Bankrupt laws, whatever may be 
the form they assume, are of that character. 
Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883). 
 60. Czarnetzky, supra note 56, at 429–30 (quoting 30 CONG. REC. 603 (1897) (emphasis 
added)).  Early commentators on the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 echoed this sentiment of bankruptcy 
law as social legislation.  As F. Regis Noel argued in 1919: 
Higher civilization demands for the individual civil liberty and equal opportunity; society 
needs the untrammeled effort of every honest man.  A practical system for the relief of 
bankrupts, because of the conflicting character of the ends to be accomplished, must 
inevitably complicate the task of the State.  Such system should be an harmonious 
combination of the maxims of the law, the rules of ethics and the principles of social 
economics.  It should be the result of the legal rights between man and man as tempered 
by Christian principles and the prerogative of society to receive the benefits of the labor 
of every member.  The laws of bankruptcy are not designed solely for the interest of the 
debtor or of the creditor or indeed for their combined interest.  The claim of justice and 
the commercial development of the nation also must be considered. 
F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 181 (1919) (emphasis added). 
 61. Tabb, supra note 46, at 364. 
 62. Id. 
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the interests of the immediately affected creditors was rejected in 
1898.”63  As a direct result of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the discharge 
was no longer viewed as an inducement to debtors to cooperate in the 
bankruptcy proceeding; instead the 1898 Act “recognized formally for 
the first time the overriding public interest in granting a discharge to 
‘honest but unfortunate’ debtors.”64 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was repealed in 1978 and replaced by 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, now known as the modern 
“Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”).”65  Significant to this evolution of the 
bankruptcy laws is Professor John M. Czarnetzky’s observation that 
“reform debates concerning the bankruptcy discharge since the 1898 Act 
have centered not around its basic utility, but rather over how it should 
be limited.”66  It is one of the fundamental premises of this Article that 
based upon current economic conditions and Congress’s foolhardy 
enactment of BAPCPA, Congress, the courts, and commentators of 
bankruptcy law must once again embrace the notion of the bankruptcy 
laws as social legislation rather than as a mechanism to clamp down on 
the efficacy of the consumer discharge, thereby perpetuating a debtor’s 
servitude to his or her creditors. 
The social utility of providing individual debtors with a fresh start is 
deeply rooted in American bankruptcy law.67  In perhaps the most cited 
recitation of the fresh start principle, the Supreme Court of the United 
States stated as follows in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt: 
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to “relieve the 
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit 
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities 
consequent upon business misfortunes.”  This purpose of the act has 
been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as 
well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate 
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at 
the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for 
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-
existing debt.68 
                                                     
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
 66. Czarnetzky, supra note 56, at 431. 
 67. So too in English bankruptcy law, upon which American bankruptcy law is predicated.  As 
early as 1765 William Blackstone commented that by virtue of a discharge “the bankrupt becomes a 
clear man again; and, by the assistance of his allowance and his own industry, may become a 
u[s]eful member of the commonwealth.”  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *484. 
 68. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citations omitted); see also U.S. Dep’t 
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The linchpin of the consumer discharge is that the debtor must 
demonstrate forthrightness and honesty throughout the bankruptcy 
proceeding, including in the disclosures and financial information 
provided on the bankruptcy petition and accompanying schedules.69  The 
idea that bankruptcy should be a respite for only the honest debtor has 
existed since the early nineteenth century.  “As early as 1817, Congress 
was petitioned to pass a bankruptcy statute that would ‘shelter the honest 
and unfortunate debtor.’”70  By extrapolation, then, the granting of the 
discharge is not an absolute right, but is dependent upon the ingenuous 
dealings of the debtor.71  Indeed, one bankruptcy court noted that 
“‘[a]ccuracy, honesty, and full disclosure are critical to the functioning of 
bankruptcy,’ and are ‘inherent in the bargain for the discharge.’”72  To 
this end, unless the individual debtor violates a proscribed form of 
behavior contained within the Code or developed through federal-
bankruptcy law, an individual who files for bankruptcy relief can 
ordinarily obtain a discharge from the majority of his or her pre-petition 
debts in exchange for surrendering any non-exempt assets.73 
More precisely, there are two components to the consumer discharge, 
namely, an affirmative “global” discharge of all pre-petition 
indebtedness and an exception from the “global” discharge for certain 
types of debts that Congress has deemed inappropriate for debtor-
forgiveness.  In a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, the “global” 
discharge is provided by § 727 of the Code, which provides that a court 
“shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless” the debtor violates some form  
                                                                                                                       
of Health & Human Servs. v. Smith, 807 F.2d 122, 123 (8th Cir. 1986) (“The bankruptcy laws 
embody a congressional policy to free an honest debtor from his financial burdens and thus allow 
him to make an unencumbered fresh start.” (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645–46 
(1974))). 
 69. See In re Slentz, 157 B.R. 418, 420 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993) (“Since the proper operation of 
the bankruptcy system depends, to a large extent, upon debtors honestly and forthrightly completing 
the schedules and statements which are filed with the court, attempts at cheating cannot be made to 
appear too attractive.”). 
 70. Howard, supra note 42, at 1050 (citing 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 415 
(Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834)).  As Professor 
Margaret Howard notes, “[t]hroughout the nineteenth century, petitions asking Congress to pass a 
bankruptcy law and the legislative histories of the various statutes passed reveal a concern that 
discharge be available only for honest debtors.”  Id. 
 71. See In re Williams, 286 F. 135, 137 (W.D.S.C. 1921) (“The granting of a discharge is not 
an absolute right, existing at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.  It is dependent upon 
the square dealings and honest purpose of the bankrupt as evidenced by his acts and doings after the 
filing of his petition.”). 
 72. In re Kestell, 99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting the lower court). 
 73. See Jackson, supra note 42, at 1393. 
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of proscribed behavior, mostly attributable to the lack of candor or 
outright disobedience by the debtor.74 
The types of prohibited conduct that would lead to a denial of the 
discharge pursuant to § 727 of the Code relate to either the debtor’s 
behavior leading up to the bankruptcy filing or his or her conduct during 
the bankruptcy proceeding itself.  For example, a court may deny a 
debtor’s discharge if he or she: (i) transferred or destroyed property 
within one year before the filing date “with the intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud a creditor”;75 (ii) transferred or destroyed “property of the estate” 
after the bankruptcy petition is filed;76 (iii) “concealed, destroyed, 
mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve” any financial 
documents;77 (iv) made a false oath or presented a false claim in 
connection with the bankruptcy case;78 or (v) failed “to obey any lawful 
order of the court other than an order to respond to a material question or 
to testify.”79  Quite significantly, then, a debtor who either transgresses a 
prohibited behavioral norm, fails to perform his or her duties in the 
bankruptcy case, or abuses the bankruptcy process itself will be denied 
any discharge of pre-petition debts under § 727 of the Code.80 
Even if the individual debtor conforms to the appropriate standard of 
behavior so as to receive his or her “global” discharge under § 727 of the 
Code, it is still quite possible for a specific debt to be excepted from the 
discharge by operation of § 523.81  Section 523 provides for nineteen 
categories of debts to be excepted from discharge;82 the types of debts 
excepted from discharge constitute a congressional determination that a 
creditor’s interest in recovering full payment of a debt within the 
categories of debts specified in § 523(a) “outweigh[s] the debtor’s 
interest in a complete fresh start.”83  Of principal importance for the 
consumer debtor, some of the debts excepted from discharge under § 
523(a) include income taxes, credit card debt, student loans, and  
 
                                                     
 74. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2006).  The “global” discharge in a Chapter 13 individual 
rehabilitation bankruptcy case is much broader in scope.  See § 1328(a). 
 75. § 727(a)(2)(A). 
 76. § 727(a)(2)(B). 
 77. § 727(a)(3). 
 78. § 727(a)(4). 
 79. § 727(a)(6)(A). 
 80. Royal Am. Oil & Gas Co. v. Szafranski (In re Szafranski), 147 B.R. 976, 981 (Bankr. N.D. 
Okla. 1992). 
 81. See § 523(a) (listing types of debt not discharged even with a discharge under § 727). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Alibatya v. New York Univ. (In re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)). 
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financial obligations arising from a domestic support obligation or 
marital separation agreement.84 
The interrelated remedies of the consumer discharge, namely, the 
denial of the “global” discharge and the specific exceptions to the 
“global” discharge under § 523, serve the bankruptcy-law policy of 
affording a fresh start “only to the honest but unfortunate debtor.”85  
Finally, the notion of the fresh start is effectuated by § 524 of the Code,86 
which provides an injunction against any effort to collect a discharged 
debt as a personal liability of the debtor.87 
Although the enactment of the Code in 1978 was initially viewed as 
a victory for debtors, over the past thirty years, the notion of bankruptcy 
law has radically changed.  Instead of a law affording financially 
struggling debtors with an opportunity for a second financial life, 
bankruptcy law became viewed as an evil sword rather than a much 
needed shield—a law that enabled debtors to cavalierly shed their debts 
without any moral compunction regarding honoring their contractual 
obligations, the subject matter to which this Article now turns. 
III. THE CREDIT INDUSTRY’S REBELLION AGAINST THE BANKRUPTCY 
STATUS QUO 
The enactment of the modern Bankruptcy Code in 1978 was a 
watershed event, particularly because it was the first promulgation of a 
federal bankruptcy law that did not directly respond to an economic 
depression.88  More significantly, though, the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was 
viewed by many as favoring consumer debtors to the detriment of their 
creditors, in part because the Code increased exemption levels and 
                                                     
 84. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (15) (2006).  In order to have a particular debt 
excepted from discharge, it is incumbent upon the complaining creditor to initiate an adversary 
proceeding against the debtor, which results in a separate legal proceeding in the bankruptcy court.  
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).  The burden of establishing the non-dischargeability of a debt is 
upon the creditor objecting to the discharge.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4005.  By operation of § 523, 
“any debt not excepted by Congress in the Bankruptcy Code is presumed to be dischargeable.”  
Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371, 372 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995). 
 85. Szafranski, 147 B.R. at 981. 
 86. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2006). 
 87. See Jarrett v. Dep’t of Taxation (In re Jarrett), 293 B.R. 127, 131 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) 
(“The purpose of the discharge injunction of § 524 is to promote the fresh start policy of the 
Bankruptcy Code by protecting a debtor against actions brought on prepetition debts.”); see also 
Gross, supra note 31, at 62 (“An individual debtor’s statutory ability to obtain a fresh start has its 
primary locus in the discharge and exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 88. Tabb, supra note 50, at 32.  See also Flint, supra note 42, at 551 (“The [Bankruptcy] Code 
was the first bankruptcy law passed without the direct intervention of a financial disaster.”). 
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broadened the categories of debts that could be discharged.89  Of marked 
significance to this Article is Professor Richard Flint’s historical 
observation that the enactment of the Code in 1978 signified the 
continuing trend of 178 years of bankruptcy legislation evolving from a 
process of attempting to achieve singularly a greater return for creditors 
to one of “concern for the wellbeing of the financially downtrodden.”90 
Following the 1978 enactment of the Code, the number of 
individuals filing for personal bankruptcy increased dramatically.91  In 
the six years following the enactment of the Code, the number of 
bankruptcy filings increased more than any other time in history.92  In 
                                                     
 89. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 23, at 52 (“In the context of consumer bankruptcies, the 
Code is most notable for its significant expansion of the protection afforded to bankrupt debtors.”); 
Tabb, supra note 50, at 36 (“Discharge was made readily available save but for a number of 
excepted debts.”); Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An 
Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1987) (“The ‘fresh start’ consideration appears to have been 
paramount when Congress revised personal bankruptcy procedures under the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, commonly referred to as the new Bankruptcy Code.  The Code raised the exemption 
level applicable in personal bankruptcy cases and widened the types of debt which could be 
discharged.” (footnote omitted)).  As noted by Professor Karen Gross: 
At the heart of the [congressional reform] effort [which began in 1968] was a 
congressional bias in favor of preserving and promoting the rights of individual debtors 
and encouraging them to utilize the federal bankruptcy system to achieve a fresh start.  
The resulting legislation—the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978—substantially simplified 
the procedures for individual debtor recourse to bankruptcy relief and, despite the 
consumer credit industry’s considerable opposition, expanded the rights of and 
protections accorded to individual debtors under the federal bankruptcy laws. 
Gross, supra note 31, at 75–76 (footnote omitted). 
 90. Flint, supra note 42, at 552.  In support of his own thesis of a natural law theory of morality 
justifying the consumer discharge, Professor Flint observes as follows: 
The historical treatment of debtors in the United States also reflects a rich heritage of 
growth in the area of social justice.  Thus, the underlying goal of the consumer 
bankruptcy process has evolved from retaliation, to compensation, and now to 
compassion and concern for those less fortunate in our society.  Through this evolution 
the fundamental values of dignity, humanitarianism, and fairness have become more 
firmly entrenched. 
Id. at 554. 
 91. A great deal of research, employing both legal and social science methodologies, has been 
conducted in an attempt to explain the significant spike in consumer bankruptcy filings following the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.  See generally Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. 
Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: A Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1993); 
William J. Boyes & Roger L. Faith, Some Effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 29 J.L. & 
ECON. 139 (1986); F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
187 (1998); Ian Domowitz & Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
on Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 J.L. & ECON. 803 (1993); Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, 
Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice: Evidence from the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 461 (1999); Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the 
Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 
(1998). 
 92. Domowitz & Eovaldi, supra note 91, at 804.  “The number of nonbusiness cases filed in the 
twelve-month period ending June 30, 1980, was 277,884.  For the years ending June 30, 1981, 
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1983, 286,000 consumer-bankruptcy cases were filed; by 2003, this 
figure approximated 1.6 million consumer-bankruptcy cases per year, an 
increase of 560% in a twenty-year period.93 
As the number of personal-bankruptcy filings rose during the 1980s 
and 1990s, an incredibly loud alarm rang through the commercial-
lending and credit industries.  As Professor Charles G. Hallinan 
observed, with the increased consumer-bankruptcy filings following the 
enactment of the Code “was a spreading concern (or at least suspicion) 
that some significant portion of consumers resorting to bankruptcy might 
be doing so in the absence of ‘real need,’ obtaining a discharge 
notwithstanding a capacity to repay and an absence of financial 
distress.”94  As a result of this “concern,” a movement for the re-
examination of the efficacy of the existing bankruptcy laws surfaced.95  
Given the opportunity, creditor interest groups circled their proverbial 
wagons and lobbied Congress intensely for a “crackdown” on the 
dynamics of consumer bankruptcy.96 
One of the major proponents for bankruptcy-reform legislation was 
the Bankruptcy Issues Council, which consisted of major credit-card 
companies and financial institutions that issued credit cards to 
consumers.97  Another creditor interest group that lobbied heavily for 
bankruptcy reform was the National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition, 
which consisted of such institutions as MasterCard, Visa, and the 
American Bankers Association.98  Viewing the rise in consumer 
                                                                                                                       
through June 30, 1984, the number of cases filed were 313,499; 311,690; 305,082; and 282,151.  
The previous record number of cases in a year was 254,484 in 1975.”  Id. at n.4. 
 93. Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or 
Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1071 (2004). 
 94. Hallinan, supra note 23, at 89. 
 95. The re-examination of the Code was largely engendered by the increase in bankruptcy 
filings during the 1980s and 1990s.  From 1978 to 1998, yearly bankruptcy filings rose from 200,000 
to 1.4 million.  Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: 
A Classic Battle Over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 509, 514 (2003).  The increased 
trend of consumers filing for bankruptcy protection “ignited a debate among pro-debtor and pro-
creditor groups about whether the Bankruptcy Code need[ed] to be reformed.”  Id. at 515. 
 96. See id. at 516 (“The great surge of bankruptcies in the 1990s provided the credit industry 
with ammunition to seek bankruptcy reform that would make it more difficult for people to avoid 
paying their debts.  The surge in bankruptcy cases is generally considered to be the single, most 
important factor moving bankruptcy reform along.”); see also Elizabeth Warren, The Changing 
Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 192 (1999) (noting that in the 
1997-1998 debates over bankruptcy law reform, “[t]he most stunning move was the coordination and 
solidification of efforts among consumer creditors”); Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or 
Progress? A Political History of Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
J. 343, 347 (1999) (noting that pro-creditor interest groups had been actively advocating for 
bankruptcy reform since the early 1990s). 
 97. Landry, supra note 95, at 516–17. 
 98. Id. at 517. 
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bankruptcies as a function of debtors attempting to evade paying their 
financial obligations, these creditor interest groups and other financial-
lending institutions spent more than $100 million lobbying Congress for 
a reformation of the Code.99  In an effort to forestall the escalation in 
consumer-bankruptcy cases, the credit and commercial-lending 
industries undertook a massive, concerted campaign and lobbying effort 
to have the Code revamped.100 
In 1996, when the number of bankruptcy filings reached the one 
million mark, the credit interest groups seized the opportunity to promote 
the need for bankruptcy reform.101  As Professor Warren recounts, 
“[f]uelling the fire at every opportunity and making every effort to 
confirm investigative reporters’ worst suspicions, the lobbyists [hired by 
the credit industry] sent out thousands of press releases declaring that the 
rising tide of bankruptcy was swollen by morally slack consumers who 
could repay their debts.”102  The efforts of the credit industry to turn the 
winds of change against the individual debtor extended well beyond 
multiple press releases.  The creditor interest groups commissioned 
studies to be conducted, demonstrating that debtors could in fact repay 
significant portions of their debts.103  Generally speaking, the studies 
commissioned by the credit industry assumed one of three different 
approaches. 
                                                     
 99. See David K. Stein, Comment, Wrong Problem, Wrong Solution: How Congress Failed the 
American Consumer, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 619, 630 (2007); see also Warren, supra note 96, at 
193 (“Influence in Washington was wielded by the $300-an-hour lobbyists on behalf of a well-
organized, well-funded creditor interest group.  Other interest groups were active, but they had 
neither the resources nor the commitment to match the credit industry focus on consumer 
bankruptcy.”). 
 100. Domowitz & Eovaldi, supra note 91, at 804 (“As reports of the increase in bankruptcy 
filings were published, various creditor organizations and major consumer lenders expressed alarm 
and concern.  They presented Congress with evidence of the impact of the Code and advanced 
various proposals to amend the Code in ways which would make bankruptcy more costly and less 
beneficial to nonbusiness debtors.”).  For a detailed discussion of the efforts made by the creditor 
community to have the Code amended in response to the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings, see 
Warren, supra note 96, at 194–96.  See also Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy 
Reform: The Need for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1301–05 (2006); 
Landry, supra note 95, at 515–18. 
 101. See Landry, supra note 95, at 516 (“The great surge of bankruptcies in the 1990s provided 
the credit industry with ammunition to seek bankruptcy reform that would make it more difficult for 
people to avoid paying their debts.  The surge in bankruptcy cases is generally considered to be the 
single, most important factor moving bankruptcy reform along.”). 
 102. Warren, supra note 96, at 195; see also Gross, supra note 31, at 77 (“Bolstered by media 
attention to the rising rate of bankruptcies and by the apparent ability of individual debtors to avoid 
their obligations through the bankruptcy laws, the industry maintained that its recoveries were 
unnecessarily diminished solely because abusive debtors were manipulating the Code to their 
advantage.” (footnote omitted)). 
 103. Warren, supra note 96, at 195. 
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The first approach was to quantify the amount of unrecoverable loan 
indebtedness as a result of individuals resorting to the bankruptcy 
process.104  “For example, MasterCard International and Visa USA 
funded a study by the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates 
Group in which the study found that bankruptcy cost the economy $44 
billion in 1997.”105  The second approach to the credit-industry studies 
aimed to demonstrate the decline in the stigma associated with filing for 
bankruptcy protection.106  Third, and most significantly, the credit-
industry studies purported to show that consumer debtors could in fact 
repay substantial portions of their indebtedness, but instead choose to 
discharge their unsecured debts through the bankruptcy process.  As one 
commentator has elucidated: 
 Other creditor-funded studies focused, not on the costs to the 
economy as a whole, but on whether bankruptcy filers could pay a 
portion of their debts under [a] proposed needs-based test.  In 1998 
Ernst and Young estimated that about 15% of Chapter 7 filers could 
pay about 64% of their general unsecured debt.  A similar study in 
1999, also conducted by Ernst and Young, found that about 10% of 
Chapter 7 filers could pay about 53% of their general unsecured debt.  
According to the 1998 and 1999 studies, the total amount that could 
have been repaid was $4 billion and $3 billion respectively.107 
Simply put, the campaign lodged by the credit industry and its 
minions proved to be keenly focused, well organized, and highly 
politicized.  Their efforts proved unrelenting, insofar as the bankruptcy 
                                                     
 104. Landry, supra note 95, at 519. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (footnotes omitted).  The commissioned studies were not, however, the end of the credit 
industry’s campaign.  The credit community hired former politicians and high-powered law firms to 
further their interests in achieving bankruptcy-law reform.  As Professor Elizabeth Warren recounts: 
Former Secretary of the Treasury and kindly senior Democrat, Lloyd Bentsen, was 
hired to make a public pitch for bankruptcy reform—without disclosing that he worked as 
a credit industry lobbyist.  Former Republican National Committee Chairman, Haley 
Barbour, and senior Washington lawyer, Lloyd Cutler, signed on to the creditors’ cause.  
Big law firms with little experience in consumer bankruptcy law, such as Washington’s 
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, and San Francisco’s Morrison & Forrester, dedicated teams 
of lawyers to writing and advising on bankruptcy laws.  These teams were often staffed 
and led by corporate lawyers with no experience in consumer bankruptcy.  Advertising 
agencies developed campaigns to illustrate the cost of bankruptcy to ordinary families, as 
the consumer credit industry took out full page advertisements in Washington-area 
newspapers.  Lobbyists were available for every talk show, to call every editorial staff 
and consumer affairs reporter, and to respond to every unfavourable story in the press.  
Messages and themes were developed, so that the same quotes appeared with multiple 
attributions.  All in all, it was a well-orchestrated campaign. 
Warren, supra note 96, at 195–96. 
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system was portrayed to the public as being abused by wealthy debtors 
who shunned their moral responsibilities to repay their debts and instead 
opted to file for bankruptcy protection.  Moreover, the credit industry 
shrewdly framed the issue of resorting to bankruptcy as a systemic 
problem that caused harm to everyone’s collective financial well-being.  
Contrary to the credit industry, the community representing the interests 
of debtors did not have the finances or political clout to mount an 
opposing campaign.  It is no doubt tremendously difficult to organize 
diffuse individuals who may have a common interest (that is, to the 
extent they can forecast a slide into bankruptcy), but no ability to 
communicate with one another ex ante about their common financial 
concerns.  Consequently, after more than approximately twelve years of 
vigorous lobbying efforts, the credit industry found a receptive ear in 
Congress in the early 2000s, and an overhaul of the Code commenced.  
The result was the enactment of BAPCPA in 2005, a controversial topic 
to which this Article now turns. 
IV. THE ENACTMENT OF BAPCPA AS ANTI-DEBTOR LEGISLATION 
The principles and policies of bankruptcy law can be viewed 
historically, in part, as a result of the dominant political climate.108  This 
notion was borne out on April 20, 2005, when President Bush signed 
BAPCPA into law.  By all observers’ accounts, the day marked a 
significant turning point in the direction and dynamics of consumer 
bankruptcy in the United States.109  As noted, after approximately a 
dozen years of concerted lobbying efforts, the credit industry and 
financial lending institutions found a sympathetic ear in Congress and the 
White House.  More poignantly, though, and as Professor Tabb 
commented, “[t]he enactment of BAPCPA marked the successful 
culmination of over two score years of intense, fervent, and well-funded 
                                                     
 108. See Warren, supra note 96, at 190 (“Since the discretion of the legislative body shapes the 
bankruptcy system, bankruptcy laws can be understood, not only as a function of the internal 
intellectual coherence of the economic system, but as a function of the politics of adoption.”). 
 109. See Ralph Brubaker, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy: Assessing a New Paradigm, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (“Congress’s enactment of [BAPCPA] has wrought the most significant revision 
of the bankruptcy relief available to individual debtors in over 100 years.”); Ronald J. Mann, 
Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 376 
(noting that BAPCPA “radically altered the policies underlying consumer bankruptcy in this 
country, marking a significant shift in favor of creditors”); Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer 
Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 31 (“The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act . . . dramatically changed several aspects of individual consumer 
bankruptcy law.”). 
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lobbying by the consumer credit industry.”110  In other words, the credit 
industry won, and future debtors lost. 
By and large, the rationale for the enactment of BAPCPA was “to 
curtail alleged consumer abuses arising from the previous quarter century 
of bankruptcy reform.”111  Stated slightly differently, BAPCPA 
purportedly stands as a corrective remedy to stem the tide of abusive 
consumers “gaming” the system by resorting to bankruptcy relief and 
failing to pay their debts.  Nothing could be further from reality.  What is 
more remarkable about the enactment of BAPCPA is that Congress itself 
recognized that abuse of the bankruptcy system was limited to only a few 
outliers.  The House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 
legislation affirmatively notes that “abuse in the system is not 
widespread and that most bankruptcy filings result from causes beyond 
debtors’ control, such as family illness, job loss or disruption, or 
divorce.”112  Bowing to the special interests of the credit industry is 
perhaps the only sensible rationale for the enactment of BAPCPA.113  In 
part, the theory of consumer utility advanced in this Article serves to 
counterbalance this political power inequality by advocating for a 
broader consumer-bankruptcy discharge for debtors who do not run afoul 
of § 727 of the Code. 
                                                     
 110. Charles J. Tabb, The Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 9, 9. 
 111. Thomas Bak et al., A Comparison of the Effects of the 1978 and 2005 Bankruptcy Reform 
Legislation on Bankruptcy Filing Rates, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 11, 11 (2008). 
 112. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt.1, at 4 (2005) reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 91. 
 113. Almost every bankruptcy-law scholar has criticized BAPCPA in one form or another.  See, 
e.g., Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 349, 349 (2008) (referring to BAPCPA as a “defectively designed and poorly drafted mess”); 
Margaret Howard, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 451, 451 (2007) (“My 
purpose is to talk about the 2005 Amendments and how things are going with the new provisions.  
But where do you start, with a bad law?”).  Criticisms of BAPCPA have also found expression in 
judicial decisions.  For example, in In re Sosa, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western 
District of Texas stated as follows regarding BAPCPA: 
The Congress of the United States of America passed and the President of the United 
States of America signed into law the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (the “Act”).  It became fully effective on October 17, 2005.  
Those responsible for the passing of the Act did all in their power to avoid the proffered 
input from sitting United States Bankruptcy Judges, various professors of bankruptcy law 
at distinguished universities, and many professional associations filled with the best of 
the bankruptcy lawyers in the country as to the perceived flaws in the Act.  This is 
because the parties pushing the passage of the Act had their own agenda.  It was 
apparently an agenda to make more money off the backs of the consumers in this country.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Act has been highly criticized across the country.  
In this writer’s opinion, to call the Act a “consumer protection” Act is the grossest of 
misnomers. 
In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005). 
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Although BAPCPA caused substantive changes in the Code effecting 
both consumer bankruptcies and traditional business restructurings, the 
overwhelming public fanfare and publicity surrounded—and continues to 
surround—the changes to Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Code, 
predominantly the province of individual debtors.  It is beyond the scope 
of this Article to detail all of the changes to the consumer-bankruptcy 
system wrought by BAPCPA; however, to date a wealth of scholarly 
literature already exists examining the substantive amendments in 
BAPCPA along with the anticipated consequences to consumer-
bankruptcy law.114  The passage of BAPCPA unjustifiably shifted the 
balance of rights in the consumer-bankruptcy context decisively in favor 
of creditors, and as a consequence of the legislative amendments thereto, 
seriously threatens the eradication of the fresh start policy for those in 
need.  A brief examination of the most critical amendments in the 
legislation bears this out. 
The most infamous alteration of the Code as a result of BAPCPA, 
and in direct response to the desires of the credit industry, is the “means 
test” contained in § 707(b).115  The means test was implemented with the 
aim of restricting eligibility for relief under Chapter 7 of the Code and 
forcing more debtors into Chapter 13 repayment plans.  Section 
707(b)(1) provides in part that the bankruptcy court may dismiss a 
Chapter 7 case filed by an individual whose debts are primarily 
consumer debts,116 or, with the consent of the debtor, the court can 
convert the case to a Chapter 13 proceeding if the court finds that 
continuing the Chapter 7 case would constitute “abuse.”117  In short, the 
means test requires the bankruptcy trustee to examine the income and 
expenses of most individual debtors.  As amended, § 707(b) of the Code 
requires a court to presume abuse of Chapter 7 if the amount of the 
debtor’s remaining income, after specified expenses and other amounts 
                                                     
 114. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 100; Braucher, supra note 113; Jean Braucher, The 
Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be 
Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93; Howard, supra note 113; Robert M. Lawless, The Paradox of 
Consumer Credit, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 347; Mann, supra note 109; Tabb, supra note 32; Tabb, 
supra note 110; Wedoff, supra note 109. 
 115. See Tabb, supra note 32, at 12 (“Imposition of a means test has been the Holy Grail sought 
by the consumer credit industry for over a third of a century.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).  
The means test is also incorporated in Chapter 13, whereby above median-income debtors must 
calculate the amounts necessary to fund their plans in accordance with the standards found in § 
707(b).  See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006). 
 116. Section 101(8) of the Code defines “consumer debt” to mean a debt “incurred by an 
individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2006).  The 
upshot of the definition is that most every consumer debtor will be impacted by the means test. 
 117. § 707(b)(1). 
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are deducted118 from the debtor’s “current monthly income,”119 when 
multiplied by sixty, exceeds the lower of the following: “(I) 25 percent of 
the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $6,575, 
whichever is greater or (II) $10,950.”120 
When reduced to practical figures, the consequences of the means 
test are dramatic.  For those individual debtors whose “current monthly 
income” is less than $100 after the defined deductions are considered, no 
presumption of abuse under the means test arises and the debtor can 
remain in Chapter 7, assuming the debtor survives an arguably second-
layered abuse test contained within § 707(b)(3).121  If a debtor has 
“current monthly income” of $100 after the requisite expenses and 
deductions are considered, a presumption of abuse arises unless the 
outstanding debt exceeds $24,000.122  Further, if the debtor’s “current 
monthly income” after the available expenses are deducted is between 
$150 and $166.66—nothing more than a single trip to the grocery 
store—a presumption of abuse arises unless the overall debt exceeds 
approximately $36,000 to $39,998.123  Finally, if the “current monthly 
income” is more than $166.66 after available deductions, a presumption 
of abuse always arises.124  Under the means test, a presumption of abuse 
may be rebutted only by the debtor demonstrating “special 
circumstances, such as a serious medical condition,” and “to the extent 
                                                     
 118. The permitted expenses and deductions are tied to the Internal Revenue Service guidelines 
for national and local living standards.  See § 707(b)(2)(A). 
 119. The Code defines “current monthly income” in part to mean 
the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives (or in a joint case 
the debtor and the debtor’s spouse receive) without regard to whether such income is 
taxable income, derived during the 6-month period ending on—(i) the last day of the 
calendar month immediately preceding the date of the commencement of the case if the 
debtor files the schedule of current income required by section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii); or (ii) the 
date on which current income is determined by the court for purposes of this title if the 
debtor does not file the schedule of current income required by section 
521(a)(1)(B)(ii) . . . . 
§ 101(10A). 
 120. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 121. Section 707(b)(3) of the Code provides as follows: 
In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of 
the provisions of this chapter in a case in which the presumption in subparagraph (A)(i) 
of such paragraph does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider—(A) whether the 
debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or (B) the totality of the circumstances (including 
whether the debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need for 
such rejection as sought by the debtor) of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates 
abuse. 
§ 707(b)(3). 
 122. Wedoff, supra note 109, at 52. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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such special circumstances that justify additional expenses or 
adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable 
alternative.”125 
A study conducted by Professor Jean Braucher concludes that in 
practice, the means test only affects a “small” number of debtors in 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.126  According to Professor Braucher, “only 
eight or nine percent of Chapter 7 debtors” have an income above the 
median income for the particular state of filing, the condition precedent 
for triggering the means test.127  To complement Professor Braucher’s 
findings, a recent empirical study conducted by a group of academics in 
several different disciplines concluded that BAPCPA does not have the 
result Congress intended, namely, forcing high-income earners into 
Chapter 13 repayment plans.128  As these scholars conclude, the 
individuals filing for bankruptcy are not high-income earners shirking 
their contractual obligations, but rather individuals and families 
struggling with insurmountable debt loads.129 
But while the means test admittedly affects a minority of consumer 
debtors filing for either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, even Professor 
Braucher concedes that the means test still produces “quite a volume of 
cases.”130  As Professor Braucher opined in her own examination of 
BAPCPA, if one assumes 
a million consumer bankruptcy filings per year, 666,000 in Chapter 7 
and 340,000 in Chapter 13—figures that approximate 2008 filing 
levels—and assuming eight percent are above median income in 
Chapter 7 and twenty-seven percent are above median income in 
Chapter 13, that means there are about 53,000 Chapter 7 cases and 
nearly 92,000 Chapter 13 cases a year in which presumed abuse means 
testing matters.131 
And while a portion of these debtors will satisfy the means test to 
remain in Chapter 7 or not be chained to a disposable income calculation 
in Chapter 13, it remains that tens of thousands of Chapter 7 debtors per 
                                                     
 125. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 126. Braucher, supra note 113, at 378. 
 127. Id. at 383. 
 128. Lawless et al., supra note 9, at 361. 
 129. Id. at 373 (“In sum, when looking at measures beyond just income, the families filing for 
bankruptcy today are in worse shape than those filing in earlier years.  Family by family, median net 
worth continues to sink, and bankrupt households are struggling with ever-larger mortgages and total 
debt loads.”). 
 130. Braucher, supra note 113, at 384. 
 131. Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
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year are in danger of being deprived of their discharge, and tens of 
thousands of Chapter 13 debtors per year are in danger of failing to 
receive their delayed discharges by mandated repayment plans that later 
prove infeasible.132  As the great swath of scholarly literature 
overwhelmingly demonstrates, these debtors are not spendthrifts 
attempting to evade their financial obligations, but moderate income 
debtors and their families trying to survive everyday life.133 
A second change in BAPCPA affecting most consumer debtors 
concerns the dischargeability of credit-card debt in either Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 13 of the Code.  Pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), a discharge in either 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 does not discharge a debt “for money, property, 
services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent 
obtained—(A) by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud . . . .”134  For purposes of this section, BAPCPA prescribes that 
“consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than 
$550 for luxury goods or services incurred by an individual debtor on or 
within 90 days before the order for relief under this title are presumed to 
be nondischargeable.”135  Moreover, pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), “cash 
advances aggregating more than $825 that are extensions of consumer 
credit under an open end credit plan [(e.g., a credit card)] obtained by an 
individual debtor on or within 70 days” before the bankruptcy filing are 
presumed to be nondischargeable.136  Lastly, for purposes of this 
exception to discharge, the Code defines “luxury goods or services” to 
not include goods or services “reasonably necessary for the support or 
maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”137 
How, then, does § 523(a)(2)(A) fit into credit-card debt and impinge 
upon an individual debtor’s complete fresh start?  To begin, credit-card 
debt comprises a significant amount of the total aggregate indebtedness 
in most every consumer-bankruptcy case.138  This is possibly the reason 
that institutional credit-card lenders will often object to a consumer  
 
                                                     
 132. Pursuant to § 1328(a) of the Code, a Chapter 13 debtor does not receive a discharge until all 
payments contemplated by the three- to five-year plan are made.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2006). 
 133. See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 36; WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 36; Braucher, 
supra note 113; Braucher, supra note 100; Lawless et al., supra note 9; Porter & Thorne, supra note 
44; Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (2002); Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status, supra note 36; Warren, The 
Growing Threat, supra note 36; Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 36. 
 134. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 135. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I). 
 136. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(II). 
 137. § 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II). 
 138. Singer, supra note 43, at 336. 
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debtor’s discharge of these particular debts using § 523(a)(2)(A) of the 
Code. 
Responding to this objection, courts have adopted an “implied 
representation” theory with respect to a debtor’s election to receive a 
credit card and have the issuer extend credit on his or her behalf.  
Because the debtor makes no actual representation to the creditor when 
using a credit card, and the issuer does not contemporaneously rely on 
any representation by the debtor, courts hold that a debtor’s use of a 
credit card amounts to an implied representation of an intention to repay 
the charges incurred.139  Other courts interpret § 523(a)(2)(A) more 
broadly, holding that a credit-card debtor implicitly represents both the 
intent and the ability to repay the credit-card issuer.140 
Moreover, because determining whether a debtor subjectively 
intended to repay the debt is most often a futile inquiry, courts utilize a 
“totality of the circumstances” standard to construe a debtor’s state of 
mind.141  Courts frequently consider the following factors to be relevant 
in determining the debtor’s intent: 
1. The length of time between when the charges were made and the 
bankruptcy filing; 
2. Whether an attorney was consulted concerning the filing of 
bankruptcy before the charges were made; 
3. The number of charges made; 
4. The amount of the charges; 
5. The debtor’s financial condition at the time the charges were made; 
6. Whether the charges were above the account’s credit limit; 
7. Whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day; 
                                                     
 139. See, e.g., Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Ritter (In re Ritter), 404 B.R. 811, 824 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2009); see also Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Swanson, 398 B.R. 328, 335 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2008) 
(“Bankruptcy law provides that use of a credit card constitutes an implied representation of the 
cardholder’s intent to repay the charges.”); G.E. Money Bank v. Wyble (In re Wyble), 387 B.R. 603, 
607 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008) (holding same). 
 140. Ritter, 404 B.R. at 824. 
 141. Chase Bank v. Brumbaugh (In re Brumbaugh), 383 B.R. 907, 912–13 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2007); see also MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hostetter (In re Hostetter), 320 B.R. 674, 685 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. 2005) (“In determining whether debts were incurred with no intention to repay them, many 
courts look at the totality of circumstances.”). 
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8. Whether the debtor was employed; 
9. The debtor’s prospects for employment; 
10 .The debtor’s financial sophistication; 
11. Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor’s buying habits; 
and 
12. Whether the purchases were made for luxuries.142 
As can be discerned from the multiplicity of factors courts consider, 
this inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis.  As a result, both consumer 
debtors and their credit card issuers lack any level of certainty as to 
whether the debtor will successfully discharge a critical portion of his or 
her overall indebtedness.  Ironically, because courts consider the debtor’s 
financial condition and employment status at the time the charges were 
made, it is eminently conceivable that the debtors who need to rely on 
credit cards during a time of crisis—e.g., loss of employment or 
unexpected medical condition—are the very same debtors who could be 
denied a discharge of their credit-card debt for fraud. 
BAPCPA also amended the time intervals between discharges and 
made a Chapter 13 discharge unavailable under certain circumstances.  
Prior to BAPCPA, a debtor was prohibited from receiving a discharge in 
a Chapter 7 case if he or she had received such a discharge during the 
preceding six years.143  Through § 727(a)(8) of the Code, BAPCPA 
increased the time interval between Chapter 7 discharges to once every 
eight years.144  In the Chapter 13 context, BAPCPA introduced a 
prohibition on receiving a discharge in a subsequent Chapter 13 case if 
the debtor had received either a Chapter 7 discharge during the preceding 
four-year period or a Chapter 13 discharge in the preceding two years.145 
Finally, to a limited degree, BAPCPA made it more difficult for 
consumers to discharge student-loan debt.  Admittedly, the 
dischargeability of student loans has been a controversial issue since 
before the enactment of the Code in 1978.  But the issue remains of vital 
                                                     
 142. Ritter, 404 B.R. at 826. 
 143. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2006) (stating that the court shall grant the debtor a discharge 
unless “the debtor has been granted a discharge . . . in a case commenced within six years before the 
date of the filing of the petition”). 
 144. See § 727(a)(8) (stating that the court shall grant the debtor a discharge unless “the debtor 
has been granted a discharge . . . in a case commenced within 8 years before the date of the filing of 
the petition”). 
 145. § 1328(f). 
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importance because today’s college students may be unable to repay 
student loans at unprecedented levels.  As a recent book describes, the 
current higher education regime can be viewed as a “debt-for-diploma” 
system.146  In the recent past, approximately two-thirds of all college 
financial aid took the form of grants; today, two-thirds originates from 
loans.147  Further, tuition at public universities has risen approximately 
122% over the past twenty years.148  The upshot is that for many college 
students, obtaining a four-year degree—not to mention a graduate 
degree—requires the incurrence of substantial debt. 
As one commentator recounts: 
Prior to 1977, there was no provision in the bankruptcy laws regarding 
the dischargeability of educational loans.  Section 523(a)(8) was 
enacted with the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 in 
response to the perception that a growing tide of students were abusing 
the bankruptcy laws by discharging large amounts of educational 
indebtedness shortly after leaving school, despite having well-paying 
jobs and few other debts.  To the extent that a failure to repay student 
loans would have an adverse impact upon funds available for future 
generations of students, it was thought that the national interest in 
providing educational assistance through student loan programs would 
be seriously undermined.  Thus, safeguarding the integrity of the 
student loan programs while curtailing the ability of student borrowers 
to unfairly exploit its benefits were the twin objectives of the 
legislation.149 
Section 523(a)(8) of the Code creates a presumption of 
nondischargeability for educational loan debt.150  Prior to BAPCPA, only 
government-sponsored educational loans were encompassed by § 
523(a)(8); stated differently, private educational loans were likely 
                                                     
 146. JOSÉ GARCÍA ET AL., UP TO OUR EYEBALLS: HOW SHADY LENDERS AND FAILED 
ECONOMIC POLICIES ARE DROWNING AMERICANS IN DEBT 92 (2008). 
 147. Id. at 99. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Singer, supra note 43, at 387 (footnotes omitted). 
 150. Section 523(a)(8) provides as follows: 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does 
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—(8) unless excepting such debt from 
discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the 
debtor’s dependents, for—(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in 
whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or (ii) an obligation to 
repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or (B) any other 
educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual. 
§ 523(a)(8). 
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dischargeable through the bankruptcy process.  Under BAPCPA, 
however, “both government-sponsored and private student loans are 
nondischargeable” in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases.151  While this may 
appear trivial at first, an increasing amount of student-loan debt arises 
from private lending institutions as the cost of tuition skyrockets. 
A debtor seeking to discharge student-loan debt falling under § 
523(a)(8) has the burden of demonstrating that “excepting the debt from 
discharge will cause the debtor and his or her dependents to experience 
‘undue hardship.’”152  Under the so-called Brunner test153 for undue 
hardship, a debtor seeking to discharge his or her student loans must 
prove that: 
(1) based on current income and expenses, the debtor cannot maintain a 
“minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to 
repay the loans; (2) additional circumstances exist indicating that this 
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the 
repayment period for the student loans; and (3) the debtor has made a 
good faith effort to repay the loans.154 
Much like the standard for evaluating the dischargeability of credit-
card debt, some courts adopt a totality of the circumstances standard for 
determining whether the nondischargeability of the educational loan debt 
will result in “undue hardship.”  These courts consider the following: 
“‘(1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial 
resources; (2) a calculation of the debtor’s and his or her dependent’s 
reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts 
and circumstances surrounding each particular bankruptcy case.’”155  At 
essence, § 523(a)(8) requires that bankruptcy courts utilize a certain 
amount of discretion to determine “how much personal sacrifice society 
expects from individuals who accepted the benefits of guaranteed student 
loans but who have not obtained the financial rewards they had expected 
to receive as a result of their educational expenditures.”156 
                                                     
 151. In re Orawsky, 387 B.R. 128, 144 n.26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 152. Miller v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Miller), 409 B.R. 299, 307 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 153. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 154. Miller, 409 B.R. at 303. 
 155. Halverson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Halverson), 401 B.R. 378, 384 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
2009) (quoting Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 156. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.14[2] (15th ed. 2007). 
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V. EXISTING SCHOLARLY THEORIES OF THE CONSUMER DISCHARGE 
Ever since the concept of a discharge of one’s indebtedness first 
appeared in Anglo-American jurisprudence more than three centuries 
ago, scholars, commentators, legislators, and judges have vigorously 
debated over whether a discharge should be available at all, and if so, 
what policy justification exists for relieving a debtor of the contractual 
obligation to repay a valid debt.  In the past twenty-five years, modern 
scholars have advanced several competing theories for justifying the 
consumer discharge; these normative explanations will be examined 
below. 
A. The “Debtor Cooperation” Theory 
The debtor-cooperation theory, offered by Professor Tabb, provides 
a historical justification for the consumer-bankruptcy discharge.  Under 
this theory, the discharge is “a carrot dangled in front of debtors to 
induce them to cooperate with the trustee and the creditors in the 
bankruptcy case in the location, collection, and liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets.”157  This theory was the primary justification for offering 
the earliest discharge in England and in the American Bankruptcy Act of 
1800.158  Simply put, if the debtor cooperated to the satisfaction of the 
creditors, then the debtor received a discharge; if not, the discharge was 
denied.159  At this time in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the bankruptcy 
laws were focused entirely on maximizing the recovery for creditors, and 
not upon the rehabilitation of the downtrodden debtor.160  This concept is 
underscored by the fact that in order for a debtor to receive a discharge of 
debt during this period of time, even if he or she fully cooperated with 
the creditors, the creditor body had to affirmatively consent to the 
awarding of the discharge by at least a majority, if not by two-thirds 
creditor vote.161 
The debtor-cooperation theory still exists today in the embodiment of 
§ 727 of the Code.162  As noted earlier, if the debtor, for example, fails to 
disclose fully his or her assets or fails to obey a court order to turn over 
                                                     
 157. Tabb, supra note 49, at 90. 
 158. Id. at 91. 
 159. Id. at 90. 
 160. See id. at 91, n.261 (compiling authority that the earliest discharges were offered to further 
creditors’ interests). 
 161. Id. at 91. 
 162. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2006). 
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non-exempt assets to the bankruptcy trustee, then a court can deny the 
debtor a global discharge of all pre-petition debt.163  That said, however, 
perhaps the most significant detraction to the debtor-cooperation theory 
is the difficulty in justifying it in light of § 523(a) of the Code.  From the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 to the enactment of BAPCPA, the list of debts 
specifically excepted from discharge has gradually expanded.164  More 
particularly, debts excepted from discharge today, at least presumptively, 
include student loans and credit cards—categories of debt that drown 
many debtors. 
If this is the case, then allowing creditors to obstruct a debtor’s 
complete discharge creates a disincentive for debtors to cooperate 
voluntarily in the bankruptcy case, a necessary condition for the 
successful operation of the entire bankruptcy process.  This disincentive 
is magnified by the fact that in most every bankruptcy case, the 
bankruptcy trustee or the court has no concrete way of verifying whether 
the debtor has been completely truthful in the petition and schedules 
regarding the real and personal property the debtor possesses.  Stated 
slightly differently, neither the trustee nor the court undertakes a physical 
inventory or search for all of the debtor’s possessions.  Therefore, the 
incentive is great for debtors who are burdened with credit-card debt, 
student-loan debt, or any other type of debt potentially excepted from 
discharge to improperly shelter assets from the reach of the bankruptcy 
system. 
B. “Impulse Control” and “Incomplete Heuristics” Theories 
Over twenty years ago, Professor Thomas H. Jackson offered two 
underlying theories for the consumer discharge, premised upon 
“volitional and cognitive justifications,”165 both paternalistic in nature.166  
The first theory advanced by Professor Jackson is a volitional 
justification premised upon the notion of “impulse control.”167  Professor 
                                                     
 163. Id. 
 164. See § 523(a) (declaring certain types of debt to be excepted from discharge). 
 165. Jackson, supra note 42, at 1405–06. 
 166. The notion of paternalistic protection of the consumer as a justification for the bankruptcy 
discharge may once again prove in vogue given the Obama Administration’s recent proposal of 
creating a new federal agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, which would, if adopted, 
“dictate standards for some [financial] products before banks could bring them to market, and push 
banks to favor plain vanilla loans over more exotic home loans, which could be required to carry 
warnings.”  Andrew Martin & Louise Story, Banks Brace for Fight Over an Agency Meant to 
Bolster Consumer Protection, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at B6. 
 167. Jackson, supra note 42, at 1408. 
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Jackson argues that “people, like animals, exhibit a tendency to choose 
current gratification over postponed gratification, even if they know that 
the latter holds in store a greater measure of benefits.”168  Because of this 
psychological tendency towards immediate gratification, Professor 
Jackson believes the bankruptcy discharge serves as a control mechanism 
for people’s impulsive behavior to incur debt without fully accounting 
for or appreciating the later harmful effects such indebtedness may have 
on their financial well-being.169  On this note, Professor Jackson 
contends: 
If unrestrained individuals would generally choose to consume today 
rather than save for tomorrow, and if this tendency stems in part from 
impulse, they may opt for a way of removing or at least restricting that 
choice.  If individuals cannot control the impulse themselves, they may 
want the assistance of a socially imposed rule, one that will simply 
enforce the hypothesized decisions of their fully rational selves.170 
To support his theory of impulse control, Professor Jackson 
characterizes the individual consumer as “an addict, unable to consider 
or plan for the future.”171  The theory proves problematic for two reasons.  
First, Jackson fails to define what he means by consumption.  That is, are 
these irrational individuals buying unnecessary wide-screen televisions, 
or are they incurring credit-card debt to pay for groceries or medical 
bills?  The empirical studies conducted by Professor Warren and others, 
which have largely gone unchallenged, suggest otherwise: namely, that 
the typical consumer debtor is borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.172  
Second, and closely associated with the first critique, Professor Jackson’s 
impulse control theory is palatable only if the incurrence of debt is not 
necessary for everyday survival.  In other words, the now cash-strapped 
debtor is generally not someone who irrationally over-indulged in the 
enticement of consumerism like a starving dog gobbles a bowl of food.  
Instead, incomes are not keeping pace with rising expenses, medical 
costs have skyrocketed (even for the luckily insured), and over-inflated 
home valuations force many to incur significant mortgage debt for only a 
modest home. 
Professor Jackson’s second justification for the consumer discharge, 
one based on cognitive processes, is identified as a theory of “incomplete 
                                                     
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1409. 
 170. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 171. Id. at 1408. 
 172. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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heuristics.”173  Admittedly an enticing theory, Jackson argues that the 
consumer discharge is needed because individual consumers, when 
making credit decisions, systematically underestimate future risks and 
overestimate future success.174  More specifically, Professor Jackson 
contends that in hindsight, if individuals were aware of their incomplete 
knowledge regarding their future financial prospects, they would 
certainly want “a system that would make some of the consequences of 
their borrowing avoidable.”175  For Jackson, the discharge serves this 
function by freeing individuals from the adverse effects of incomplete 
heuristics.176 
However, as Professor Tabb recognized, Jackson’s “volitional and 
cognitive arguments . . . do not readily account for the discharge 
exceptions” contained within § 523 of the Code.177  If, as Jackson 
suggests, individuals cannot control their impulses or they routinely 
underestimate the risks associated with incurring debt, and 
correspondingly overestimate the chances of future success, then 
precluding the complete discharge for such significant debts like student 
loans and credit cards does not offer much in the way of correcting for 
these asserted deficiencies. 
C. The Humanitarian Theory of the Consumer Discharge 
A third major justification for the consumer discharge is premised 
upon principles of humanitarianism.  In modern bankruptcy law 
scholarship, the humanitarian theory is probably best associated with 
Professors Karen Gross and Richard E. Flint.178  As the name suggests, 
the humanitarian theory is premised upon the notions that forgiveness of 
indebtedness and a demonstration of mercy toward individuals inundated 
with debt are appropriate justifications for having a consumer-
bankruptcy discharge.  According to Professor Gross, forgiveness of 
indebtedness is appropriate if four preconditions are met: (i) “there must 
                                                     
 173. Jackson, supra note 42, at 1410.  To Professor Jackson, in this context, “‘heuristics’ refers 
to the tools that individuals employ in processing and assessing information.”  See id. at 1411. 
 174. Id. at 1410. 
 175. Id.  As Jackson states, “Much evidence indicates that the errors associated with incomplete 
heuristics, especially anchoring, lead decisionmakers systematically to overestimate chances of 
success and to underestimate the corresponding risks.”  Id. at 1411–12. 
 176. Id. at 1414. 
 177. See Tabb, supra note 49, at 100. 
 178. See generally GROSS, supra note 38 (arguing for a social welfare underpinning of 
bankruptcy); Flint, supra note 42 (addressing moral justifications for debtor financial relief 
provisions in bankruptcy). 
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be a wrong committed”; (ii) “the wrong must harm another”; (iii) “the 
wronged party resents what occurred”; and (iv) “the wrongdoer 
acknowledges the wrong done and takes steps to rectify it.”179  By 
extrapolation, Professor Gross contends that these conditions are found 
in the bankruptcy dynamic.  That is, the “wrong” is the debtor’s failure to 
pay legitimate financial obligations;180 the non-payment of the debt 
harms creditors who are not paid for their goods or services, or who are 
deprived of an investment that would have yielded a profit; the creditors 
harmed by the debtor’s failure to honor his or her contractual obligations 
certainly resent such conduct;181 and, by filing for bankruptcy protection, 
a debtor acknowledges publicly his or her failure.182 
According to this aspect of the humanitarian theory, forgiving 
indebtedness serves a restorative function for both debtors and creditors 
alike.  The consequences of filing for bankruptcy protection—and the 
subsequent scrutiny into the debtor’s personal and financial affairs—
enable the “wronged” creditors “to feel that the disequilibrium created by 
nonpayment has been at least partially restored.”183  For the debtor, the 
transformative power of the bankruptcy process provides him or her with 
“the opportunity to regain self-esteem and become once again a 
productive member of society.”184 
Professor Flint’s take on the humanitarian theory of the consumer 
discharge is grounded in a natural law theory of morality.185  According 
to Professor Flint, the consumer-bankruptcy system in American society 
has evolved from one of retaliation and punishment, to compensation for 
creditors, to “compassion and concern for the less fortunate in our 
society.”186  As Professor Flint argues, through this evolutionary process, 
the discharge of the consumer debtor recognizes the inherent dignity of 
every human to be afforded an opportunity to earn a living and puts him 
or her back on the road to self-determination.187  In short, under the 
                                                     
 179. GROSS, supra note 38, at 93. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 93–94. 
 182. Id at 94. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Flint, supra note 42, at 519–20.  As Professor Flint states: “By stressing that the law reflects 
reason and conscience, this article should convince even the skeptic that fundamental principles of 
fairness and humanitarianism form the moral dimension of the debtor relief provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”  Id.  at 526. 
 186. Id. at 554. 
 187. In Professor Flint’s words: 
The debtor relief process can be viewed as congressional recognition that the intrinsic 
value of human dignity dictates that a debtor be given an opportunity to earn a living.  
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humanitarian theory of discharge, oppressive debt obligations undermine 
a debtor’s sense of self-worth; by freeing the debtor of these financial 
constraints, a debtor theoretically regains his or her sense of self-
worth.188 
Critiques of the humanitarian theory have found expression in the 
existing scholarly literature, and thus will not be recounted at length.189  
Nonetheless, Professor Tabb raises two interesting theoretical questions 
engendered by the humanitarian theory that have not yet been addressed 
by its proponents: “First, should the creditor’s consent (or lack thereof) 
to participate in the societal forgiveness scheme be considered at all in 
the equation?  Second, should the debtor have to be deserving in some 
fashion to be able to appropriate for himself society’s discharge gift?”190  
Despite the critiques of the humanitarian theory of consumer discharge, 
the main goals advanced by the theory, restoring a sense of self-worth 
and the freeing of human capital, have direct applicability to the theory 
of consumer utility advanced by this Article, as will be demonstrated 
below. 
D. The Economic Theory of the Consumer Discharge 
An economic theory for the consumer discharge is perhaps best 
associated with the work of Professors Margaret Howard and John M. 
Czarnetzky.  Professor Howard advocates a theory of discharge in 
straightforward, yet powerful terms.  That is, the underlying justification 
for the discharge is “to restore the debtor to participation in the open 
credit economy.”191  Implicit in Professor Howard’s theory is that the 
availability of a discharge incentivizes a debtor who has become idle in 
his or her occupation—presumably because the income generated from 
working primarily benefits existing creditors—to return once again to his 
or her optimally producing self. 
                                                                                                                       
The freeing of human capital provides an individual debtor with the ability to maintain a 
minimum standard of living and puts him back on the road to self-determination.  Thus, 
discharge is an acknowledgment by Congress that the dignity of the individual person has 
value. 
Id. at 536 (footnote omitted). 
 188. Tabb, supra note 49, at 95. 
 189. See, e.g., Jason J. Kilborn, Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A Radical 
Reassessment of Individual Bankruptcy, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 883–94 (2003); Tabb, supra note 49, 
at 95–99. 
 190. Tabb, supra note 49, at 97. 
 191. Howard, supra note 42, at 1048. 
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Professor Czarnetzky offers an overarching theory of the discharge 
which he denominates as the “‘entrepreneurial hypothesis.’”192  To 
Professor Czarnetzky, the bankruptcy discharge is available in order to 
resolve the “tension between freedom of contract and freedom of action 
in the market.”193  To this end, the bankruptcy discharge is “part of the 
institutional framework vital to fostering entrepreneurship in the 
market.”194  Stated differently, the bankruptcy discharge allows the 
honest individual engaged in business to be freed from the constraints of 
impossible debt when unexpected and unavoidable business misfortune 
occurs.195  In short, for Professor Czarnetzky, the consumer discharge 
encourages the individual to act in an entrepreneurial spirit within the 
institution of the marketplace.196  In sum, Professor Czarnetzky 
concludes that the “gains from entrepreneurship in the form of social 
improvement and prosperity are larger than the losses to the debtor’s 
creditors from the discharge of his debts.”197 
Admittedly, the economic theory for the consumer discharge 
advanced by Professors Howard and Czarnetzky form a basis for the 
theory of consumer utility advanced in this Article.  The individual 
consumer debtor, and by extrapolation, the universe of consumer debtors, 
are benefitted by a discharge that serves to return them to economic 
productivity as a functioning member of the credit economy.  The theory 
of consumer utility advanced herein, however, accounts for more than 
just the economic rehabilitation of the individual debtor.  It serves to 
promote not only the financial well-being of the debtor, but the physical, 
psychological, and familial well-being of the debtor as well.  Moreover, 
                                                     
 192. Czarnetzky, supra note 56, at 397. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 399. 
 195. Professor Czarnetzky argues thusly: 
As presently constituted, the availability of the bankruptcy discharge provides the 
entrepreneur the assurance that if he acts honestly but fails, he will not be subject to debt 
servitude and the will of his creditors for some extended period of time.  He therefore is 
much more willing to act entrepreneurially than he would be otherwise.  Without the 
discharge, his concern about the consequences of failure, and his knowledge that failure 
can befall even the brilliant and diligent entrepreneur, will lead him to be more hesitant, 
less likely to act entrepreneurially.  On the other hand, the entrepreneur knows that if he 
acts dishonestly or dissolutely, the bankruptcy system will not provide him with a 
discharge, and he will bear the full brunt of his sins. 
Id. 
 196. As Professor Czarnetzky argues: “the entrepreneurial hypothesis provides a justification for 
the individual discharge that has little to do with the debtor and his individual profile—a subject of 
much heated debate in the scholarly literature—but rather the institutional environment which best 
encourages the entrepreneur to act.”  Id. 
 197. Id. at 414. 
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and as will be discussed below, recent empirical scholarship has argued 
that the consumer discharge in its present form does not completely 
restore a debtor to financial wellness.  Thus, the theory of consumer 
utility offers arguably a broader discharge than that advanced by 
Professors Howard and Czarnetzky—one that will help address these 
recent empirical findings.  With this background, this Article now turns 
to developing the theory of discharge based upon consumer utility. 
VI. CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM RECONSIDERED AS A THEORY OF 
CONSUMER UTILITY 
As many are aware, the utilitarian philosophical movement is 
generally regarded as having originated with Jeremy Bentham in the 
early nineteenth century.198  While classical British empiricism had been 
concerned with the nature, scope, and limits of human knowledge, the 
utilitarian movement engendered by Bentham was a practical affair, 
premised upon legal and political reform.199  “The general idea of 
utilitarianism is that the right decision is the one that produces the 
greatest good or utility.”200  And in contrast to deontology,201 with its 
concern for the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of the act itself, 
utilitarianism is consequentialist by nature,202 concerned fundamentally 
with the outcome of a given act to determine its justness.203 
                                                     
 198. FREDERICK COPLESTON, 3 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1 (Doubleday 1966).  That said, 
however, an argument may be made that utilitarian thought began even earlier than Bentham, with 
ANTHONY A.C. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, in 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES 237 (2004), and FRANCIS HUTCHESON, An 
Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF 
BEAUTY AND VIRTUE 180 (3d ed. 1729), wherein Hutcheson stated the principle of utility as follows: 
“[t]hat Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that, 
worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.”  Bentham himself was heavily influenced by David 
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature and Principles of Morals, in addition to the French 
Enlightenment philosopher Helvetius.  COPLESTON, supra, at 4. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s Children: The Problems of 
Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 191 (2001). 
 201. Deontological theory asserts that “[c]ertain kinds of act are intrinsically right and other 
kinds intrinsically wrong.  The rightness or wrongness of any particular act is thus not . . . 
determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences.”  David McNaughton, Deontological 
Ethics, in CONCISE ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 202 (2000). 
 202. The theory of consequentialism “assesses the rightness or wrongness of actions in terms of 
the value of their consequences.”  David McNaughton, Consequentialism, in CONCISE ROUTLEDGE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 201, at 169. 
 203. See HODGSON, supra note 39, at 1 (“Utilitarian appraisal is appraisal by reference to 
consequences.  The thesis that acts should be so appraised is the common feature of the moral 
systems which come under the name ‘utilitarianism.’”); Timothy Fuller, Jeremy Bentham and James 
Mill, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 721 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987) 
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Bentham conveyed his utilitarian philosophy primarily in his famous 
work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
published in 1789.  At the outset in his work, Bentham describes the 
underlying dynamics for his philosophy as follows: 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.  On the one hand 
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and 
effects, are fastened to their throne.  They govern us in all we do, in all 
we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our 
subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.204 
As a result of Bentham’s view of the human condition being 
governed by both pain and pleasure, he developed his “principle of 
utility” to guide not only individual decisions, but also the legislative 
decisions of government.  To Bentham, the principle of utility is that 
“which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to 
the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the 
happiness of the party whose interest is in question; or, what is the same 
thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness.”205  In 
operation, Bentham’s principle of utility was geared toward his fictitious 
“community,” rather than toward each individual member comprising 
                                                                                                                       
(“To utilitarians, consequences must be weighed whenever arguments arise among alternative 
possible courses of action.  Whenever individuals permit each other to express opinions, or find they 
cannot escape them, they must argue the relative merits of differing courses of action with respect to 
their possible outcomes.”); Marco J. Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to 
Contract Law Remedies, 56 UCLA L. REV. 59, 64 (2008) (“It is a rough, but not entirely inaccurate, 
characterization to say that whereas a consequentialist would focus on the end of a given act to 
determine whether or not that act is just or unjust, a nonconsequentialist making a similar 
determination would focus instead on the means used to achieve that end.”).  See also KWAME 
ANTHONY APPIAH, THINKING IT THROUGH: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 
206 (2003) (contrasting consequentialism from deontology); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION 
OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 2 (1994) (“In contrast to consequentialist conceptions, standard 
deontological views maintain that it is sometimes wrong to do what will produce the best available 
outcome overall.”).  As Professor Marco J. Jimenez describes, the “war” between consequentialism 
and deontology has been raging for more than a century, with “each side [sending] its champion to 
do battle, and, although bloodied, scarred, and exhausted from the fight, each is still standing, with 
no clear winner or end in sight.”  Jimenez, supra, at 59 (footnote omitted).  It should, however, be 
noted that R.G. Frey submits that consequentialism and utilitarianism are distinct, as “[o]ne may be a 
consequentialist without being a utilitarian, as with ethical egoists, and one may be a utilitarian 
without being a consequentialist, as with rule-utilitarians and adherents to the different forms of 
utilitarian generalization, all of whom specifically reject the view that acts are right or wrong solely 
in virtue of their consequences.”  R.G. Frey, Introduction: Utilitarianism and Persons, in UTILITY 
AND RIGHTS, supra note 39, at 5. 
 204. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
11 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1978) (1789). 
 205. Id. at 12. 
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that community.206  In other words, public utility was Bentham’s primary 
concern.207 
With respect to the “community,” or general public, Bentham 
summarized the principle of utility as follows: “[t]he general object 
which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to augment the total 
happiness of the community; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, 
as far as may be, everything that tends to subtract from the 
happiness . . . .”208  Thus, according to utilitarianism, an act is considered 
just to the extent that it increases pleasure, or happiness, and unjust to the 
extent that it decreases pleasure, or to the contrary, increases pain.209  
Stated perhaps more concretely, proper actions, laws or institutions 
operating pursuant to a utilitarian philosophy “are those which achieve 
the greatest happiness for the overall community,”210 or the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. 
Although Bentham produced the principle of utility as a rationale for 
legislation,211 it is no doubt a workable theory that can be adequately 
applied to specific areas of law.212  Nevertheless, while the overarching 
theory of utilitarianism is easy to reproduce, more circumspect issues 
need to be raised and addressed before the theory can be adapted and 
applied to a specific area of the law, and in this instance, bankruptcy law.  
In addition, the issues to be addressed by their nature also raise the 
criticisms that have been lodged against utilitarianism during 
approximately the past two centuries.213 
                                                     
 206. As Bentham explained: 
The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in 
the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost.  When it has a 
meaning, it is this.  The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual 
persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members.  The interest of the 
community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of the several members who compose 
it. 
Id. 
 207. NANCY ROSENBLUM, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 7 (1978). 
 208. BENTHAM, supra note 204, at 158. 
 209. Jimenez, supra note 203, at 74. 
 210. Tibor R. Machan, Some Philosophical Aspects of National Labor Policy, 4 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 67, 129 (1981). 
 211. ROSENBLUM, supra note 207, at 9. 
 212. Other areas of the law that have been explained by utilitarian theory include criminal law, 
contracts, and torts.  See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103, 106 (1979).  See generally Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: 
Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115 (2001) (discussing a utilitarian 
approach to punishment); Jimenez, supra note 203, at 59 (arguing for a utilitarian approach to 
contract law). 
 213. As Peter J. King explains, “[b]ecause he was primarily a reformer, Bentham’s philosophy 
and psychology is simple, crude, and open to all manner of objections and has been lambasted not 
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The first question a utilitarian-derived theory must face is: What is 
utility?  Or, put differently, what is the good that ought to be maximized 
by a law or a policy?  As noted, Bentham expressed his utility maximand 
as “happiness” or “pleasure.”  Bentham identified fourteen “simple 
pleasures” to which human beings are susceptible: the pleasures of sense, 
wealth, skill, amity, a good name, power, piety, benevolence, 
malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, association, and 
relief.214  These identified “simple pleasures” mean what they mean in 
ordinary terms, no more and no less.215  That said, however, for Bentham 
“happiness” or “pleasure” is a relativistic concept, and one not dependent 
upon hedonistic ethics.216 
Before defining the maximand of the proposed theory, one additional 
observation of Bentham’s philosophy is necessary.  Significantly, 
Bentham did not view the law as immutable.  Rather, he recognized that 
because the consequences of a given policy may change, the moral 
quality of the policy or law may change as well.  As noted by Nancy 
Rosenblum, to Bentham the act of lawmaking “must be recognized as a 
continual process in response to diverse and changing desires that require 
adjustment.”217  If one accepts this characterization of the mutability of 
the classic utilitarian theory, then a law that seemed “good” and 
appropriate at a certain point in time might prove “bad” and 
inappropriate at some later date.  As such, lawmakers and judges must be 
sensitive to changing social circumstances. 
This flexibility regarding utilitarian philosophy’s ability to adapt 
lends credence to adopting a utilitarian approach to the consumer 
discharge.  The promulgation of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code constituted a 
movement in the evolution of bankruptcy law that was decidedly pro-
debtor.  A reversion back to the creditor-centric Bankruptcy Code began 
in the early 1990’s as the credit industry undertook the efforts described 
above to convince Congress of widespread debtor abuse, despite the 
wealth of empirical studies suggesting otherwise.  Congress, however, 
                                                                                                                       
only by his foes and impartial critics but even by his friends.”  PETER J. KING, UTILITARIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICA: THE INFLUENCE OF BENTHAM AND AUSTIN ON AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 42 (1986). 
 214. BENTHAM, supra note 204, at 42.  Conversely, Bentham identified twelve “simple pains,” 
as follows: the pains of privation, the pains of the senses; the pains of awkwardness, the pains of 
enmity, the pains of an ill name, the pains of piety, the pains of benevolence, the pains of 
malevolence, the pains of the memory, the pains of the imagination, the pains of expectation, and the 
pains dependent on association.  Id. at 33–34. 
 215. COPLESTON, supra note 198, at 8. 
 216. Id.; see also DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 100–01 (2006). 
 217. ROSENBLUM, supra note 207, at 9. 
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took the bait and enacted BAPCPA.  Simply put, another period in the 
evolution of bankruptcy law must now take place, one that accounts for 
the economic realities facing the nation’s economy. 
A theory of consumer discharge premised upon principles of 
utilitarianism can accomplish this task.  More specifically, the theory of 
consumer utility serves both as an underlying justification of why 
bankruptcy law provides for a discharge as well as a corrective response 
to the misguided enactment of BAPCPA and the current economic 
recession.  Further, the maximand to be seized upon is one that relieves 
the consumer debtor of overwhelming indebtedness and lifts him or her 
from the pit of economic suffering, and all of its resulting consequences.  
Stated in Benthamite terms, a principle of consumer utility would aim to 
promote the overall well-being of the community of debtors who file for 
bankruptcy protection each year, financially, psychologically, and 
physically, while disapproving of or seeking to diminish the “misery” 
associated with BAPCPA. 
As Professor R.G. Frey has observed, “[a]n abstract formulation of 
the principle, such as ‘[a]lways maximize net utility’ cannot be applied in 
the absence of some interpretation of utility, since one would not know 
what to maximize.”218  That said, “[t]he term ‘utility’ . . . is a blanket 
term, to be filled in by whatever standard of goodness is adopted.  The 
principle, moreover, is a maximizing one, enjoining its adherents to 
maximize in the world that which their value-theory is focused around, 
and it is applied directly to individual acts.”219 
As demonstrated previously, with the exception of BAPCPA, 
bankruptcy law in the United States since 1841 and its accompanying 
interpretation by the courts has been concerned with the financial well-
being of the downtrodden debtor and with his or her position in society.  
This observation is unassailable.  Given this reflection, it is certainly not 
a radical proposition to advance a theory for the consumer discharge that 
is primarily focused upon the collective body of debtors who file for 
bankruptcy relief each year, and less concerned with the interests of his 
or her creditors.  This is a normative choice indeed, but one that fits 
comfortably within the existing scholarly and practical paradigm of the 
bankruptcy system.  That said, one may also construe BAPCPA as a 
normative choice.  To be sure, expanding the scope of the consumer 
discharge may decrease the utility of creditors by limiting their financial 
recoveries due to the happenstance of bankruptcy.  This may, in turn, 
                                                     
 218. Frey, supra note 203, at 5. 
 219. Id. 
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cause negative externalities as a result of the consumer-utility theory 
advanced herein, namely, increased borrowing rates and the reduction of 
available credit in the future.  Arguments over such negative externalities 
have been made in the past, but the concerns have not played out, 
particularly since the availability of credit has only expanded during the 
past several decades. 
The existing scholarly literature on the justification for the consumer 
discharge raises defensible and worthwhile arguments.  But what has not 
been accomplished is the advancement of an overarching theory 
justifying the discharge that can embrace and account for all of the 
concerns of the individual debtor, and by extension, the community of 
debtors.  Thus, this Article proposes a metatheory of consumer utility to 
justify the discharge in modern bankruptcy law. 
As stated, the “good” to be maximized by a theory of consumer 
utility is the promotion of the debtor’s holistic well-being, and by 
extrapolation, the community of debtors who file for bankruptcy 
protection each year.  To begin, the prospect of a discharge for those 
inundated with debt provides an incentive to comport with the 
requirements of the federal bankruptcy laws, to be forthcoming and 
candid in the disclosure of their finances in the requisite bankruptcy 
petition and schedules, and to assist the trustee in identifying and 
collecting non-exempt assets in the Chapter 7 process.220  This accounts 
for the debtor cooperation theory of the consumer discharge as advanced 
by Professor Tabb and others.221 
A theory premised upon collective consumer utility, however, 
provides more—the overall welfare of a debtor can be further maximized 
beyond the “carrot” incentive of forthright participation.  A theory of 
consumer utility also satisfactorily accounts for the theories of discharge 
advanced by Professor Jackson.  To the extent one is comfortable with 
                                                     
 220. Knowingly and fraudulently submitting false information may result in the denial of a 
Chapter 7 discharge under § 727(a)(4) and may constitute a crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 152.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).  Furthermore, § 542(a) of the Code 
requires that any entity or person in possession of property of the bankruptcy estate must turn over 
such property to the trustee.  Section 542(a) of the Code provides as follows: 
Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than a 
custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee 
may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under 
section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the 
value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the 
estate. 
11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2006). 
 221. See generally Tabb, supra note 49, at 90 (stating “creditors essentially forego the possibility 
of postbankruptcy recovery tomorrow in the hope of reaping larger bankruptcy dividends today”). 
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accepting paternalistic attitudes towards debtors in general, a utilitarian 
theory of consumer discharge maximizes the overall welfare of debtors 
by protecting consumers from their irresistible impulses to incur 
indebtedness, even when doing so is not in their best interests. 
More significantly, the availability of a consumer discharge 
maximizes overall well-being because it provides honest but unfortunate 
debtors with a safety-net if they incur debt that later proves beyond their 
ability to repay due to the underestimation of risk or the overestimation 
of future success, or both.  Importantly, the theory of consumer utility 
advanced herein also accounts for the criticisms of Professor Jackson’s 
theories lodged by Professor Tabb.  As will be discussed below, the 
consumer-utility theory calls for the abandonment of the exceptions to 
discharge currently contained with § 523 of the Code.222  By abolishing § 
523 in whole cloth, save for the exception for debts arising from 
domestic support obligations or equitable distribution proceedings, the 
discharge can rectify problems of impulse control and incomplete 
heuristics. 
Further, a broader discharge premised upon the collective utility of 
debtors furthers the successful reintegration of debtors to economic 
productivity, in accordance with Professor Howard’s theory of economic 
rehabilitation.  Overall economic health improves by shifting people 
from a state of less productivity to a state of higher productivity.223  As 
Professor Howard has offered, the discharge enables the debtor to 
“resume economic participation in the open credit economy.”224  That is, 
consumers who are freed of constricting debt obligations can take that 
portion of their incomes once dedicated to attempting to fruitlessly repay 
their creditors and place this income into the stream of economic 
commerce.  Moreover, freed of this indebtedness, debtors will have 
every incentive to resume productivity, rather than contemplate idleness 
if working only produces a return for the creditors. 
A theory of consumer utility incorporates Professor Howard’s 
economic theory of discharge, but it too provides more, namely a broader 
discharge, largely in response to recent scholarly contributions 
suggesting that the discharge in its current state does not go far enough in 
providing a fresh start to the debtor.  In the first of such articles, 
Professor Jean Braucher suggests that “[t]he idea of a ‘fresh start’ is part 
of the mythology of consumer bankruptcy but perhaps not the reality for 
                                                     
 222. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006). 
 223. MCKIBBEN, supra note 10, at 110. 
 224. Howard, supra note 42, at 1062. 
0.6.0_SOUSA FINAL 2/22/2010  6:37:59 PM 
598 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
most of those who file.”225  Based upon her suspicion in this regard, 
Professor Braucher noted the need for a longitudinal study to be 
conducted to determine if debtors are, on average, better off financially 
“one, three, five, or ten years after a bankruptcy filing, whether in 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.”226  Following on the heels of Professor 
Braucher’s call, Professors Katherine Porter and Deborah Thorne 
conducted an empirical study on this issue and concluded that the fresh 
start is an “incomplete tool to rehabilitate those in financial distress.”227  
The results of the empirical study conducted by Professors Porter and 
Thorne are summarized in this way: 
[W]hile bankruptcy appears to help a majority of families to obtain a 
sustainable fresh start, many former debtors continue to experience 
financial hardship that is as bad as or worse than the distress that 
initially triggered their bankruptcy filings.  For many families, the fresh 
start either failed to materialize or dissipated within one year of the 
discharge of their debts.  Data that we gathered on postbankruptcy 
financial management buttressed this finding: One year after 
bankruptcy, one in four families reported that paying their expenses 
was an ongoing struggle.  For these families, the promise of a better life 
was a theoretical hope, distant from the reality of their continuing 
financial difficulties.228 
The findings by Professors Porter and Thorne are very significant, 
and many of the questions raised by their research are beyond the scope 
of this Article.  For example, Professors Porter and Thorne suggest that 
in order to achieve a fresh start in the truest sense, policy changes in the 
nation’s unemployment system and medical care system may need to be 
made.229  While a theory of discharge grounded in utility may not be the 
precise panacea called for by Professors Porter and Thorne, the broader 
discharge advocated by the theory of consumer utility certainly 
complements their work.  That is, a more generous discharge, one that 
relieves categories of indebtedness that cannot be currently discharged 
through the bankruptcy process, may help some of the debtors identified 
by Professors Porter and Thorne to realize the otherwise elusive fresh 
start.230 
                                                     
 225. Braucher, supra note 93, at 1070. 
 226. Id. at 1085. 
 227. Porter & Thorne, supra note 44, at 67. 
 228. Id. at 69–70 (footnote omitted). 
 229. Id. at 99–109. 
 230. Another recent study on this issue was released in 2008.  See Zagorsky & Lupica, supra 
note 44, at 283 (finding that a Chapter 7 discharge does not result in a fresh start in the short-term 
because it takes years for filers to catch up to non-filers in the key areas of financial stability). 
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The theory of consumer utility also accounts for the humanitarian 
theory of discharge put forth by Professors Gross and Flint.  That is to 
say relieving a debtor of overwhelming indebtedness returns one’s sense 
of self-worth and dignity in one’s personal and economic life.  Assuming 
that the stigma of having filed for bankruptcy (both self-imposed and 
externally-imposed by society in general) does not outweigh the lack of 
dignity of having become hopelessly mired in debt, then a theory of 
consumer utility also encompasses a return to human dignity for the 
honest but unfortunate debtor. 
More importantly, though, the theory of consumer utility addresses 
the questions raised by Professor Tabb with respect to the humanitarian 
theory.  First, the creditor’s consent to the “forgiveness scheme” need not 
be overtly considered in the equation.231  Without a doubt, creditors will 
not consent to a discharge of indebtedness ex ante for the purposes of 
promoting good citizenship.  But their consent is already implied in the 
consumer lending system because the cost of credit is higher overall as a 
result of the ability of a debtor to seek shelter through the bankruptcy 
process.  While no empirical study has been conducted to determine how 
much higher the cost of credit is as a result of this condition, it is 
arguably negligible when the desired outcome is to restore one’s 
humanity.  With respect to Professor Tabb’s second concern regarding a 
humanitarian approach, the debtor does in fact need to prove deserving in 
order to take advantage of the “discharge gift.”232  As will be stated 
below, the consumer-utility theory provides that only the honest, 
forthcoming debtor can take advantage of the broadened discharge. 
Although a theory of consumer utility accounts for and encompasses 
all existing scholarly theories relating to the discharge, it satisfies other 
concerns many debtors face.  Accordingly, the theory of consumer utility 
justifies the broader discharge because it helps alleviate the 
psychological, familial, and physical trauma and strain experienced by 
many debtors buried with insurmountable debt.  To date, no substantial 
empirical study has been conducted in American legal literature 
addressing the effects of debt on a debtor’s psychological and familial 
well-being.233 
                                                     
 231. Tabb, supra note 49, at 97. 
 232. Id. 
 233. It has, however, been mentioned in passing.  See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 93, at 1077–78 
(“Also, there is reason to believe that this risk pool suffers from anxiety-related psychological and 
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However, a recent study conducted by Christopher G. Davis and 
Janet Mantler with the Centre for Research on Stress, Coping, and Well-
Being at Carleton University in Canada provides some disturbing 
insights into the conditions faced by many debtors.234  As the authors’ 
findings suggest, financial stress is associated with a higher incidence of 
mental and physical health problems.235  Individuals under serious 
economic strain are likely to suffer from headaches, stomachaches, and 
insomnia.236  Moreover, for the individual, chronic financial strain is 
associated with increased alcohol consumption and even suicide.237  And, 
as perhaps expected, Davis and Mantler report that financial strain can 
oftentimes lead to clinical depression, which serves to motivationally 
cripple the individual.238 
In addition to the individualistic effects of excessive debt, Davis and 
Mantler suggest that “as financial stress increase[s], couples . . . [are] 
more likely to break up.”239  Indeed, Davis and Mantler report that in 
some cases, the pressure of over-indebtedness often leads to an increase 
in arguments between the partners as well as general marital 
dissatisfaction.240  The effects of financial distress on couples also trickle 
down to children.  According to Davis and Mantler, “[s]everal studies 
now show that parents (especially fathers) who are experiencing 
financial stress are less responsive to their children’s needs, are less 
consistent in their parenting, and are more inconsistent in their discipline 
of children.”241  The effects on children can be great: 
                                                     
 234. See generally CHRISTOPHER G. DAVIS & JANET MANTLER, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
FINANCIAL STRESS FOR INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES, AND SOCIETY (2004), available at 
http://www.doylegroup.ca/personal/reports/financial_distress_DSI.pdf (discussing how financial 
stress affects homes and communities). 
 235. Id. at 9–10. 
 236. Id. at 10. 
 237. Id. at 9–12. 
 238. Id. at 13.  As Davis and Mantler state: 
Depression is not simply sadness or laziness.  Depression is a serious mental disorder that 
not only robs people of their joy of life, but it also has significant motivational, cognitive, 
and behavioural consequences.  People who are depressed become hopelessly mired in a 
worldview where it seems that nothing they can do will change anything; where getting 
out of bed in the morning is the most difficult thing to do; and where one expects the 
worst and is not surprised when bad things keep happening.  Research indicates that 
people who are depressed are motivationally crippled (i.e., they have no energy to try), 
and they see the world through a pessimistic lens. 
Id. 
 239. Id. at 10. 
 240. Id. at 14. 
 241. Id. at 16. 
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Children of financially stressed parents tend to be more prone to 
mental health problems, depression, loneliness, and are more 
emotionally sensitive.  They are less sociable and more distrustful, and 
are more likely to feel excluded by their peers, especially if they are 
girls.  Boys of financially stressed parents are likely to exhibit low self-
esteem, to show behaviour problems in school, and be susceptible to 
negative peer pressure and alcohol and drug problems.  Financial stress 
is related to poorer academic performance in both boys and girls.242 
A theory of discharge based upon consumer utility would take these 
serious effects of financial strain into account when interpreting the 
scope of the bankruptcy discharge, particularly because the external costs 
to society are so significant.  While the credit industry proponents of 
BAPCPA liked to tout figures over how much the bankruptcy system 
costs the nation each year, they never considered the external costs to 
society in the form of a sick or chronically depressed employee, a family 
in distress, or a child experimenting with illicit drugs.  Although no 
empirical study on this issue has been conducted to date, the associated 
external costs of financial strain on the medical care and social services 
systems could be potentially quite high. 
The utility principle advanced by Bentham, interpreted as a public 
welfare standard for the community of debtors as it is here, “is 
fundamental to a work on legislation because it provides a useful 
standard of value.”243  This observation leads to the second question that 
a utilitarian-derived theory must address; namely, how does one measure 
the benefit to society by maximizing the utility value?  In other words, 
what does the greatest good for the greatest number mean?  For 
Bentham, measuring the utility to society was accomplished through a 
felicific calculus.  First, the value of a pleasure or pain to the community 
would be greater or less according to seven dimensions: its intensity, its 
duration, its certainty or uncertainty, its propinquity or remoteness, its 
fecundity, its purity, and its extent.244  After one assigns a value to the 
tendency of an act to produce pleasure or pain, Bentham instructs to 
“[s]um up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of 
all the pains on the other.”245  If, after applying this mathematical 
equation, the balance of pleasure versus pain tips in favor of pleasure,  
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then the act has the tendency to produce good results for the 
community.246 
Consequently, for Bentham the aim of legislation is to maximize the 
happiness or pleasure of the collective community, and applied here, the 
community of consumer debtors who file for bankruptcy relief.  
However, as may be obvious, one of the strongest critiques of 
utilitarianism is the impossibility of applying Bentham’s felicific 
calculus with any degree of accuracy.  Where would one even begin?  
Indeed, Bentham himself recognized the shortcomings of his own theory: 
It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued 
previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial 
operation.  It may, however, be always kept in view: and as near as the 
process actually pursued on these occasions approaches to it, so near 
will such process approach to the character of an exact one.247 
This critique of utilitarianism is arguably impossible to resolve, and 
this Article does not pretend to offer a proposed resolution that has 
otherwise escaped philosophers, economists, historians, and legal 
scholars over the past two centuries.  That said, however, and as stated at 
the outset, the principle of utility can operate as a useful standard for 
judging the efficacy of the consumer-bankruptcy system as a whole, and 
as a normative statement of the role the bankruptcy system should play in 
the lives of unfortunately downtrodden debtors. 
VII. THE CONSUMER UTILITY THEORY AS APPLIED TO THE CURRENT 
STATE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
In the historical progression of bankruptcy law in the United States, 
there has been a traditional vacillation between legislation that can be 
characterized as “anti-debtor” and legislation that is conversely 
characterized as “pro-debtor.”  Many observers would agree that the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code can be viewed as an example of “pro-debtor” 
legislation.  To the contrary, the amendments to the Code through 
BAPCPA can only be viewed as anti-debtor legislation.  Because of the 
current economic conditions and the financial reality of most consumer 
debtors—a reality that is inapposite to the one Congress envisioned when 
it enacted BAPCPA—it is time for the nation’s bankruptcy laws to shift 
once again in the direction of favoring debtors.  Doing so will require a 
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two-pronged approach.  First, bankruptcy courts must start interpreting 
most aspects of the Code in a way that promotes utility for the 
community of consumer debtors.  Second, Congress must act to repeal 
the changes in the Code occasioned by BAPCPA that threaten a true 
fresh start.  While the latter proposal may be an impossible goal, 
Congress’s recent consideration of amending the Code to permit debtors 
to modify home mortgages does provide a glimmer of hope. 
The question of how broadly or narrowly a consumer debtor’s 
discharge should be construed is unquestionably an issue of public 
policy.248  In proposing such a solution, it is virtually impossible to do so 
without first recognizing the inherent tension between the interests of 
creditors seeking repayment and the interests of debtors in escaping 
overwhelming indebtedness.  As a normative matter, the inquiry 
devolves into whether society should favor debtors as a collective group 
or whether society should protect the contractual rights of creditors.  The 
theory of consumer utility advanced herein unapologetically prefers the 
community of debtors. 
Tellingly, the prospect of applying a utilitarian approach to the 
nation’s bankruptcy laws was implicitly, though not overtly, set forth as 
early as 1919 by commentator F. Regis Noel, who stated as follows: 
This mental condition of a member of society brings to it no benefit.  
On the contrary, society must be seriously injured by the presence of 
unproductive or discontented members, who through idleness or 
vicious habits may eventually become public charges.  If the laws of 
bankruptcies were based on the legal rights of individuals, there would 
be no warrant for the discharge of debtors from the payment of their 
debts as long as they lived, or their estates would continue to exist.  But 
public policy makes it expedient that insolvent debtors, instead of being 
forever entangled by obligations as enduring as the task of Sisyphus, 
shall be given a fresh start in life under the benevolent influence of the 
ordinary incentives to industry and enterprise . . . .  On the other hand, 
this benign policy must not be permitted to foster greater evils than 
unrelieved insolvency produces.  The mode of relief should be elastic 
and graduated according to the comparative merits of the conduct of the 
debtors and the circumstances which led to their insolvency.249 
In what ways, then, can a theory of consumer utility find expression in 
the Code or in proposals for bankruptcy reform? 
                                                     
 248. See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the “Fresh Start,” 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 174, 197–98 (1994) (raising this issue in the context of § 541(a)(5) of the Code). 
 249. NOEL, supra note 60, at 188. 
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The first proposal for reform calls upon Congress to repeal § 109(h) 
of the Code, added by BAPCPA.  In sum, § 109(h) establishes that an 
individual is ineligible for bankruptcy relief unless that person has 
received “during the 180-day period preceding” the date of the petition 
an individual credit-counseling session conducted by an approved 
nonprofit budget and credit-counseling agency.250  The required briefing, 
which can take place by telephone or on the Internet and be 
accomplished in approximately thirty minutes, must outline the 
opportunities for credit counseling and assist the individual “in 
performing a related budget analysis.”251  By revising the Code in this 
manner, Congress has made its general policy choice known that debtors 
should not seek to resort to the bankruptcy process in the first instance, 
and instead must seek alternative methods for dealing with their financial 
problems prior to seeking bankruptcy relief.252  As one court has noted, 
“[t]he effect of this legislation is that bankruptcy is a remedy of last 
resort for the honest but unfortunate debtor.”253 
While debtor education may be a laudable goal, to date § 109(h) has 
served to ensnare many debtors who have not complied with the credit-
counseling requirement.  As the typical consumer debtor’s insolvency 
becomes exacerbated to the point where the individual affirmatively 
decides to seek bankruptcy relief, the prospective debtor has no idea 
what the law requires.  The end result is that the honest but unfortunate 
debtor is denied bankruptcy relief when its need is most crucial.  For 
instance, many debtors trying to stave off an impending foreclosure sale 
attempt to negotiate with the mortgage lender up until the time of the 
foreclosure sale.  If such negotiations prove fruitless, a debtor will file a 
bankruptcy petition at the eleventh hour in order to stop the 
commencement of the foreclosure sale and invoke the automatic stay 
provided by § 362 of the Code.254  Should the debtor fail to comply with 
§ 109(h), a court will either dismiss or strike the bankruptcy petition.255  
In either case, no automatic stay applies and the debtor remains in 
jeopardy of losing his or her home.  Moreover, by the time the typical 
debtor decides to resort to the bankruptcy process—a decision usually 
not made lightly and not until the pressure from creditor collection 
                                                     
 250. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2006). 
 251. Id. 
 252. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 151–52 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). 
 253. Id. at 152.  In In re Sosa, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Texas described § 109(h) as “one of the more absurd provisions of the new Act.”  336 B.R. 113, 114 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005). 
 254. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). 
 255. In re Casey, 341 B.R. 798, 804 n.17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006). 
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efforts proves unbearable—it is far too late for the vast majority to 
benefit from a thirty-minute credit counseling session.256 
The second method by which the theory of consumer utility can be 
furthered is for Congress to repeal the means test contained in § 707(b) 
in Chapter 7 cases and incorporated in Chapter 13 cases by virtue of § 
1325(b) of the Code.257  Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, former § 
707(b) provided that a court may dismiss an individual debtor’s Chapter 
7 case if the debts were primarily consumer debts and the granting of 
relief would constitute a “substantial abuse” of the Chapter 7 process.258  
Moreover, former § 707(b) specifically included a provision stating a 
presumption in favor of granting the debtor the relief requested in filing 
for Chapter 7.259  The former version of the Code did not define the term 
“substantial abuse.”  Instead, it was for the bankruptcy judges to exercise 
their discretion on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the debtor 
was committing a substantial abuse of the Chapter 7 process.  To that 
end, the majority of courts focused on the totality of circumstances “in an 
attempt to identify whether the debtor [was] not in need of Chapter 7 
relief and [was] merely seeking an advantage over creditors.”260  Prior to 
BAPCPA, judges would deny Chapter 7 relief to those debtors “whose 
pleadings in the form of the petition, schedules, statement of affairs and 
statement of income and expenses fail to reflect a need for the relief 
being sought because they do not reflect that the debtor is now suffering 
or will suffer in the near future from any meaningful economic 
hardship.”261 
Other than the rhetoric of consumer abuse spewed by the credit 
industry and accepted as gospel by Congress, no studies exist suggesting 
that the nation’s bankruptcy judges were ineffective in policing abusive 
debtors.  In other words, no empirical studies exist arguing that 
bankruptcy judges could not accurately exercise their collective 
discretion in examining the totality of a particular debtor’s economic 
circumstances.  And given the empirical research conducted by Professor 
Warren and others, no such study would exist because widespread abuse 
was never a reality of the bankruptcy-law system. 
                                                     
 256. Sean C. Currie, The Multiple Purposes of Bankruptcy: Restoring Bankruptcy’s Social 
Insurance Function after BAPCPA, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 241, 256 (2009). 
 257. See §§ 707(b), 1325(b). 
 258. § 707(b) (applying to cases filed before October 17, 2005). 
 259. Id. (applying to cases filed before October 17, 2005). 
 260. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 707.04[4] (15th ed. rev. 2007); see also Kornfield v. 
Schwartz (In re Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting a totality of the 
circumstances standard). 
 261. In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 933, 936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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Not only have the empirical studies noted in this Article established 
that the § 707(b) means test fails to capture many, if any, high-income 
debtors attempting to game the system,262 but for those tens of thousands 
of debtors each year who manage to have an extra $150 in their pockets 
each month, these debtors are forced into Chapter 13 repayment plans or 
denied access to the bankruptcy system.  Even if Congress were so noble 
as to let these debtors retain their last $150, it still would not shelter them 
and their families should another unexpected event—even as seemingly 
innocuous as a needed car repair—befall them.  However difficult it may 
be to overcome the politics backing the current law, the means test of § 
707(b) and incorporated in § 1325(b) must be repealed, and the 
“substantial abuse” test returned as it existed prior to BAPCPA. 
Further, if—as the recent studies by Professors Porter, Thorne, 
Braucher, Zagorsky, and Lupica suggest—the current iteration of the 
Code does not provide debtors with enough of a fresh start so as to return 
them to a state of sustainability for themselves and their families, then 
more should be done.  In order to effectuate the theory of consumer 
utility advanced herein, Congress should drastically revise § 523 of the 
Code and remove most of the debts currently excepted from discharge 
upon successful challenge by a creditor.  Section 523 currently provides 
for nineteen different categories of debts potentially excepted from the 
consumer discharge.263  Congress should repeal all of these categories 
with the exceptions of § 523(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (a)(15).264 
As noted, § 523(a)(2) implicates credit-card debt under the implied 
representation theory developed by the courts.  Because credit-card debt 
increasingly comprises a greater percentage of the typical debtor’s 
financial obligations, bankruptcy courts should eradicate the implied 
representation theory in response to credit-card lenders seeking to have 
their debts declared non-dischargeable.  In other words, § 523(a)(2) 
should be interpreted in a manner that does not encompass voluntary 
extensions of credit through a charge card.  Under this proposal, then, no 
reason for § 523(a)(2)(C) would exist, and it too should be repealed.  
That said, however, because the discharge should be available only to the 
                                                     
 262. Critiques of the means test already abound in the scholarly literature regarding the problems 
inherent in its application and in the potential for high-income debtors to abuse the test itself.  See, 
e.g., Braucher, supra note 100, at 1295; Tabb, supra note 32, at 1. 
 263. §§ 523(a)(1)–(19). 
 264. The exceptions to discharge contained within § 523(a)(5) and (a)(15), namely, for debts 
arising from a domestic-support obligation or incurred during a divorce proceeding, should remain 
nondischargeable primarily because of the fear of having needy former spouses and children 
becoming wards of the state and relying upon social-welfare programs.  Doing otherwise would cut 
against any discharge premised upon notions of utility.  See § 523(a)(5), (a)(15). 
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honest, forthright debtor, § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) is still needed.  Thus, if 
a debtor obtains an extension of credit through common law fraud, 
proven with the requisite mental state, then the debt should be 
nondischargeable, even under a theory premised upon utility. 
In the near future, it is expected that college graduates will default on 
educational loans in ever-increasing numbers, particularly due to the 
skyrocketing costs of secondary education and the stagnant opportunities 
in the labor market.  As a result of the current economic times, college 
students graduating during the recession will likely suffer lower wages 
for a decade or longer.265  To promote the well-being of these individuals 
and ensure their continued economic production in society, § 523(a)(8) 
should be amended to provide for the dischargeability of both 
government and private educational-loan debt after some time period 
(e.g., five years) with a good-faith attempt to repay the debt.266  If a 
creditor challenged the dischargeability of educational loans based upon 
a particular debtor’s current economic situation and future prospects of 
financial success, then a court exercising its discretion under a totality of 
the circumstances standard can determine whether it would be 
appropriate to discharge the educational loans on a case-by-case basis.  
Indeed, as Professor Howard noted more than two decades ago, the 
enactment of § 523(a)(8) was “not a legislative response to a statistically 
significant problem.”267  The same argument can be restated today with a 
certain degree of comfort. 
The most prevailing theme in bankruptcy law jurisprudence for the 
past three centuries is that refuge in bankruptcy should be available only 
to the honest but unfortunate debtor and not to debtors who have 
defrauded their creditors or who have failed to cooperate in the 
bankruptcy process.268  This ideal should not be disturbed.  Nonetheless, 
more needs to be accomplished under bankruptcy law to promote the 
overall well-being of the class of debtors who find themselves 
                                                     
 265. Sara Murray, The Curse of the Class of 2009, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2009, at A1.  This 
assertion is primarily based upon a study conducted by Lisa Kahn, an economist at the Yale School 
of Management.  Id.  The study found that “for each percentage-point increase in the unemployment 
rate, those with the misfortune to graduate during [a] recession earned 7% to 8% less in their first 
year out than comparable workers who graduated in better times.”  Id.  Moreover, this effect 
persisted over many years, “with recession-era grads earning 4% to 5% less by their 12th year out of 
college, and 2% less by their 18th year out.”  Id. at A1, A11. 
 266. This is not the first attempt to prompt Congress to revise § 523(a)(8).  More than twenty 
years ago, Professor Margaret Howard advocated for the dischargeability of student loans so long as 
the debtor did not incur the obligation with the intention of filing for bankruptcy relief rather than 
repaying the loan.  Howard, supra note 42, at 1087. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
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overwhelmed by inescapable debt.  A broader discharge than currently 
exists will help many debtors, particularly those with middle incomes, 
large credit-card debts, or high educational loans.  To be sure, the more 
generous discharge called for by the theory of consumer utility will 
certainly have its detractors, a subject to which this Article now turns. 
VIII.OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED 
Aside from the critiques of the theory posed herein that are endemic 
to classical utilitarian philosophy, there are other potential objections to 
expanding or liberalizing the discharge as it currently exists. 
A. The Problem of Moral Hazard 
Perhaps the most immediate objection to a utilitarian-derived theory 
of consumer discharge is the possibility of creating a moral hazard 
problem.  Moral hazard “refers to the tendency for insurance against loss 
to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss.”269  Stated 
differently, moral hazard is premised on the notion that individuals are 
more likely to take risks if they are insured against the consequences of 
their actions.  Applied to the dynamics of consumer debt, if bankruptcy 
law is liberalized to provide a greater discharge of indebtedness, 
consumers will be incentivized to incur greater amounts of unnecessary 
debt with the knowledge that filing a Chapter 7 petition will relieve them 
of that debt, assuming compliance with § 727 of the Code. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, liberalization of bankruptcy law may 
well lead to increased bankruptcy filings.270  Indeed, even financially 
solvent debtors will be incentivized to take greater risks in their 
investment decisions because the ramifications of default can be 
corrected by filing a bankruptcy petition that assures the debts will be 
discharged.271  As Professor Jason J. Kilborn has suggested, this may not 
be the desired message to communicate to the public regarding “financial 
responsibility and a trade-off of burdens for benefits.”272  Admittedly, 
completely eliminating the potential moral-hazard problem is perhaps an 
impossible task.  Nevertheless, four distinct observations might assuage 
those concerned about moral hazard. 
                                                     
 269. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996). 
 270. Buckley & Brinig, supra note 91, at 194. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Kilborn, supra note 189, at 884. 
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First, the argument of moral hazard is premised upon debtors 
possessing information about the bankruptcy process and the ability to 
discharge debt.  While a debtor might gain this knowledge after 
consulting with an attorney, he or she might not have any sophisticated 
knowledge of how the bankruptcy process works.  The debtor would thus 
be unaware of the available discharge “insurance” ex ante.  Although not 
based on any empirical study, it is still relatively safe to presume that the 
average consumer debtor does not have any specialized knowledge of the 
intricate workings of bankruptcy law. 
Second, although some individuals might abuse the bankruptcy 
system if a generous discharge exists, the number would be small 
compared to the debtors resorting to bankruptcy for legitimate purposes.  
Third, while the problem of moral hazard is real, the economic premise 
underlying moral hazard ignores “the larger social benefits of insurance, 
what economists would call ‘positive externalities.’”273  In other words, 
the net societal gain from a liberal discharge may offset the external costs 
to society as a whole.  Fourth, concerns about moral hazard are arguably 
alleviated by the social stigma attached to filing for bankruptcy relief.  
Even if a virtually complete discharge could be had, people would 
remain reticent to file for bankruptcy protection based upon their internal 
beliefs about how family, friends, and society in general will perceive 
them.  Although there is current academic discussion regarding whether 
a social stigma to bankruptcy still exists,274 it unquestionably remains, 
and will remain, a disincentive to seeking bankruptcy protection. 
B. The Moral Obligation to Honor Contracts 
As a second objection to the theory of consumer discharge advanced 
herein, one can argue that permitting a debtor to, in effect, breach and 
then escape his or her financial obligations offends the moral norm of 
honoring one’s contracts.275  As one scholar has noted, the moral 
obligation to respect contractual promises “is a virtually universal ethical 
precept.”276  Indeed, such an objection traces its roots to the historical 
                                                     
 273. Baker, supra note 269, at 243. 
 274. See, e.g., Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 485–88 (2006); Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 365, 380–85 (2006); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for 
Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 215–21 (1999); Lawless et al., supra note 9, at 383–85; 
Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 233–47 (2006). 
 275. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 248, at 223–29. 
 276. Hallinan, supra note 23, at 140. 
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treatment of debtors as thieves and criminals.277  Although a moral 
obligation to honor contractual promises has arguably fallen out of favor 
over the past few decades,278 it remains a viable argument nonetheless. 
Two counterarguments cut against the power of the moral obligation 
concept.  First, the bankruptcy process already permits both individual 
and corporate debtors to reject and breach contracts under various 
provisions of the Code, such as § 365 and § 1113.279  Second, a moral 
obligation argument presupposes an arms-length dynamic between 
consumer and lender in the credit transaction.  This supposition is 
incorrect—on the contrary, parity generally does not exist between 
borrower and lender.  Therefore, one can argue that precisely because of 
the great disparity in power between lender and debtor, together with the 
complexities in the consumer-credit marketplace, creditors have a moral 
obligation not to lend aggressively and improvidently.280  If they do so, 
as they have done collectively in the recent past, creditors should bear 
the financial consequences and moral responsibility when their debtors 
default.281 
C. The Transfer of Costs and Risk Allocation 
Other scholars have argued that society is better off if creditors are 
paid and debtors are required to satisfy their financial obligations.282  
This is so because the losses to creditors through a discharge are borne 
by other borrowers in the form of higher interest rates and administrative 
charges in the extension of credit.283  Moreover, institutional lenders may 
also suffer losses of equity because of numerous debtors failing to pay 
back their debt obligations.284  Not only are the losses caused by 
defaulting debtors internalized by other borrowers, but the availability of 
credit may be reduced if the costs of risk taking increases for lenders.285  
Thus, from an economic standpoint, an even broader discharge than what 
                                                     
 277. Hirsch, supra note 248, at 226. 
 278. Id. at 229 (“At any rate, other theorists today downplay or even deny the debtor’s moral 
obligation to lenders in connection with the modern market for consumer credit.”). 
 279. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 1113 (2006) (discussing the right to assume or reject 
executory contracts, unexpired leases and collective bargaining agreements, respectively). 
 280. Hirsch, supra note 248, at 229 n.177. 
 281. See id.  This is not the first time this argument has been raised.  See, e.g., John D. Ayer, 
How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355, 369 (1986); Vern Countryman, 
Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 17 (1975). 
 282. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 248, at 194. 
 283. White, supra note 89, at 2. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
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currently exists raises the costs to borrowers and future lenders.  Others 
may argue that a broad discharge will produce an inappropriate “wealth 
transfer from those debtors who avoid bankruptcy to those who succumb 
to it.”286 
To be sure, the shifting of costs from debtors receiving a broader 
discharge to future borrowers in the form of a higher cost of borrowing is 
a valid concern.  However, some observations may help alleviate some 
of this concern.  First, the national economy today is largely dependent 
upon consumer spending and individuals taking risks by incurring 
financial indebtedness.287  Thus, providing for the broader discharge 
outlined above will return the overextended debtor to economic 
productivity.288  So long as the externalities produced by a broader 
discharge do not outweigh the overall benefit to society in having 
unburdened debtors reintegrated into economic productivity, then a 
broader discharge is desirable. 
Second, given the economic consequences of improvident consumer 
lending over recent years, the shifting of even greater risk to the lending 
community will serve a corrective function, preventing such behavior 
going forward.  A number of scholars and commentators over the past 
decade have reported on the consumer-credit industry preying upon 
individual consumers who pose a significant risk of default ex ante.289  
Despite the serious collective risk, the lending community dove in.  
Perhaps the most strident charge is Professor Lupica’s recent indictment 
of the credit industry: 
The credit industry has created the pressure to borrow and knows where 
consumers’ social, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities lie.  It 
knows that consumers tend to discount the long- and short-term 
consequences of credit use, due to the temporal disconnect between the 
                                                     
 286. Hirsch, supra note 248, at 205 n.94.  Richard Posner described this possibility “as a subsidy 
from the ‘prudent’ to the ‘feckless,’ ‘a curious basis on which to redistribute wealth!’”  Id. (quoting 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.4, at 402 (4th ed. 1992)). 
 287. As Professor Karen Gross noted: 
In a capitalistic economy, we want debtors to reintegrate into the system for their sake 
and our own.  For debtors, reintegration allows the taking of new risks.  For society, 
taking risks is exactly what we want individuals and businesses to do.  This enables the 
wheels of commerce to turn; individuals fend for themselves and do not become a drain 
on scarce societal resources. 
GROSS, supra note 38, at 94. 
 288. See Hallinan, supra note 23, at 62 (noting that in the evolution of the fresh start “was a 
continuing reliance on the notion that relief measures served the public welfare by restoring the 
overburdened debtor to economic productivity”). 
 289. See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 23; Mann, supra note 109; Tabb, supra note 32; Warren, 
Financial Collapse and Class Status, supra note 36; Warren, supra note 96; Stein, supra note 99. 
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charge and receipt of a bill.  This discounting and underestimation 
extends to a number of features of credit use, including present and 
future balances, the importance of interest rates, the likelihood of a late 
payment, the speed at which interest accrues, the implications of 
merely making the minimum payment due; as well as the likelihood of 
exceeding credit limits, and credit products have been designed to 
opportunistically exploit these susceptibilities.290 
A broader discharge will also serve to increase the credit industry’s 
collective incentive to properly monitor their debtors’ financial 
circumstances and ability to repay, and will cause the lending community 
to be more judicious when deciding to extend credit in the first place.  
This shifting of risk makes sense from an economic perspective.  
Creditors are in the best position to evaluate a particular debtor’s 
financial picture and ability to repay, especially if one accepts Professor 
Jackson’s notion of incomplete heuristics.  More practically, though, 
sophisticated consumer lenders have spreadsheets and actuarial tables 
backed by complex financial models that predict their rate of loss and 
expected profit margins based upon their portfolio of borrowers.  In other 
words, the prudent lender has already calculated average expected losses 
and profits ex ante, before ever transacting with a potential customer.  So 
if a creditor lends and the debtor later fails to repay, the creditor is best 
positioned to bear the consequences of default.291 
Third, the availability of a discharge—while costs are passed on to 
those individuals not resorting to the bankruptcy process by those who 
do—serves as a “compelled purchase of credit insurance by 
borrowers.”292  To the extent that lenders do in fact conduct an 
individualized risk assessment before lending, theoretically each 
                                                     
 290. Lupica, supra note 7, at 585 (footnotes omitted).  On this topic, Professor Lupica further 
argues as follows: 
Over the past decades, consumer spending and corresponding indebtedness have 
provided the central source of fuel for the country’s economic growth: as a collective 
resource, consumers have been the chief target of exploitation by the providers of goods, 
services, and credit.  The enormous investments made in the creation and maintenance of 
the transformed consumer markets have driven this exploitation.  As the supporters of the 
policies behind the markets’ transformation began to affirmatively recognize that high 
levels of consumer debt were necessary to sustain the markets’ unprecedented 
profitability, a relentless campaign was waged to convince, cajole, and coerce consumers 
to build their lives around consumption through the routine use of credit.  The hegemony 
of the markets has proven to be a powerful force, inexorably altering cultural norms, 
consumer behaviors, and attitudes toward debt. 
Id. at 609. 
 291. See Gross, supra note 31, at 134 (arguing this point in support of her own article advocating 
for a narrow construction of the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code). 
 292. Hallinan, supra note 23, at 106. 
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individual consumer’s cost of credit will bear some relation to the 
potentiality of default and a future bankruptcy filing.293  Although 
economic theorists might be troubled by this shifting of risk through a 
form of compelled insurance, given the volatility in the national 
economy and the predatory practices of credit-industry lenders, an ex 
post facto safety-net for the universe of consumer debtors might not be 
so offensive after all. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
By most observers’ accounts, the purpose of enacting BAPCPA was 
to reduce the number of consumer bankruptcy filings,294 and to prevent 
debtors from abusing bankruptcy law.  Congress’s experiment has 
proven to be sorely misguided on both fronts.  Although the number of 
consumer debtors filing for bankruptcy slowed dramatically after the 
enactment of BAPCPA, largely because thousands of debtors rushed to 
file before the Amendments became effective on October 17, 2005, the 
number of people filing for consumer bankruptcy relief has climbed 
steadily during the past several years, and will continue to do so as the 
economic recession continues.  Further, empirical studies conducted to 
date completely dispel the fantasy of the abusive debtor attempting to 
evade his or her indebtedness and shirk financial responsibilities.  As 
perhaps has always been the case, today’s typical debtor is burdened with 
more debt than ever before, and resorts to the bankruptcy process after a 
cataclysmic event, such as a job loss, divorce, or serious medical 
problems. 
To that end, the purpose of this Article was to accomplish two goals.  
First, to propose a contemporary justification for the consumer discharge 
so as to help advance the debate over bankruptcy theory and policy, and 
to question once again the proper scope of the nation’s bankruptcy laws 
and their place in a modern, credit-based economy.  Second, to provide 
fodder for Congress to rethink many of the legislative changes to the 
                                                     
 293. In other words: 
The risk of each borrower’s future inability or unwillingness to pay is transferred to the 
lender for a premium implicit in the cost of the loan, and the lender pools that risk with 
other similar risks, thereby spreading losses among borrowers.  Moreover, due to the 
segmentation of the market and the individualization of risk assessment for each 
transaction, each borrower’s premium more or less accurately compensates for the risk 
transferred, with only minimal opportunities for subsidization by the lender or by other 
borrowers. 
Id. 
 294. See, e.g., Landry, supra note 95, at 511. 
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Bankruptcy Code occasioned by BAPCPA and for the courts to interpret 
problematic aspects of BAPCPA in a manner that promotes the overall, 
collective well-being of the flesh and blood debtors that appear in their 
courtrooms on a daily basis. 
A theory of discharge premised upon utilitarian philosophy may have 
its detractors, and the main counterarguments have been highlighted 
herein.  Perhaps no theory justifying the consumer discharge can garner 
everyone’s support.  That said, however, the theory of consumer utility 
embraces all of the rationales expressed in the past, and incorporates 
additional justifications that have been previously neglected in the 
scholarly literature.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to forecast whether 
the proposals advocated by the theory of consumer utility will in fact 
serve to provide debtors with an improved fresh start.  But that 
uncertainty is no excuse for not attempting to raise debtors out of the 
mire of debt.  However, one thing is certain: BAPCPA serves to impede 
unjustifiably the fresh start for tens of thousands of deserving debtors, 
and there is nothing in the legislation that “protects” debtors, despite 
Congress’s rhetoric.  The time is ripe for a sweeping reassessment of the 
nation’s bankruptcy laws.  If the proposals proffered in this Article are 
followed, then the borrower shall no longer be a slave to the lender.295 
 
                                                     
 295. Proverbs 22:7 (“[T]he borrower is servant to the lender.”). 
